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Focusing on truth and reconciliation commissions in Liberia and Sierra Leone, this 
thesis examines which political conditions typical of weak states had the greatest 
impact in deciding the different levels of success between the two cases.   Two 
conditions played a central role in determining each commission’s success: the de-
legitimization of the state and political fragmentation.  Their presence in Sierra Leone 
derailed that truth commission’s efforts to carry out its mandate.  Conversely, their 
absence in Liberia allowed its commission to operate relatively free of political 
impediments, leading to greater success.   
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Introduction 
 
Throughout the earth join all 
the silent wasted lips 
and speak from the depths to me all this long night… 
tell me everything, chain by chain, 
link by link, and step by step, 
                                                                                       
                                                                               - Pablo Neruda, The Heights of Machu Picchu 
 
 
This thesis examines the determinants of success for truth and reconciliation 
commissions in contexts of near state collapse following violent conflict, focusing 
specifically on the cases of Liberia and Sierra Leone.  Few conflicts of the late twentieth 
century were as harrowing as the Liberian and Sierra Leonean civil wars.  The bitter 
power struggles between government forces, various rebel factions, and international 
peacekeepers that raged across these countries from 1989 to 2003 and 1991 to 2002 
respectively were some of the bloodiest in African history.  By the end of hostilities in 
each country, over 400,000 people (mostly civilians) had been killed and countless more 
were injured or displaced in heinous acts of violence.   
In the aftermath of these conflicts, adhering to provisions laid out in their 
respective peace accords, both the Liberian and Sierra Leonean governments founded 
truth and reconciliation commissions (hereafter truth commissions or TRCs).  These 
commissions were charged with constructing a comprehensive record of the conflicts, 
citing their antecedents and principal actors, allocating responsibility for the most heinous 
crimes, and making recommendations to their governments for fostering national 
reconciliation.  While not the first truth commissions in history, the Liberian and Sierra 
Leonean commission were the first to be attempted in the context of states on the verge of 
collapse.  Labeled ‘failed states’ by much of the international community, after over a 
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decade of conflict Liberia and Sierra Leone maintained only tenuous control of their 
territories and, with few resources and little trust in government, faced the daunting task 
of democratic consolidation.  The truth commissions were to play an integral role in this 
process. 
 Interestingly, despite a number of common traits shared by the two cases, 
including similar histories, geography, language, and overlapping civil conflicts, the 
Liberian and Sierra Leonean commissions have achieved different levels of success.  
Sierra Leone’s commission was undermined nearly from its inception by the concurrent 
establishment of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, mandated to prosecute the most 
egregious crimes committed during the war.  Further, the non-binding nature of that 
commission’s final recommendations undercut its ability to do much more than produce a 
final report weighty in detail, but utterly lacking in legal force.  The Liberian case, 
conversely, has no Special Court to compete for resources or detract from its legitimacy.  
More importantly, of all the truth commissions in history it is the first whose 
recommendations are legally binding.  This greater legal potency and prestige has 
translated into the Liberian commission collecting thousands of statements from victims, 
as well as numerous high-profile individuals involved in abuses, allowing it to create a 
more nuanced depiction of the conflict.   
How did this happen?  Given the number of similarities between Liberia and 
Sierra Leone, what accounts for this divergence?  How did the political conditions that 
surrounded the creation and implementation of these commissions, while seemingly so 
similar, differ in ways that ultimately mattered in shaping the commissions’ success?  To 
begin answering these questions, this thesis will adopt a comparative framework.  Liberia 
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and Sierra Leone are comparable in a number of useful ways.  For one, the cases are 
recent.  The Liberian civil conflict ended in 2003 and its truth commission’s mandate is 
set to expire in the summer of 2009.  Sierra Leone’s war ended in 2002 and its 
commission there completed its work in 2005. Additionally, the countries share 
geographic proximity, a similar colonial history, ethnic makeup and language.  The 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) deployed peacekeeping forces 
in both countries which were largely Nigerian-led and later replaced by much larger UN 
forces.  The economies of Sierra Leone and Liberia are both export-based and centered 
on primary commodities such as rubber, coffee and diamonds.  Most importantly, both 
Liberia and Sierra Leone are widely accepted by scholars as being prime examples of 
‘failed states’.  Given these similarities, I take a closer look at the Liberian and Sierra 
Leonean cases in order to identify any underlying differences that may have affected the 
outcome of their commissions.  Specifically, I focus on political conditions, paying 
special attention to those that are most commonly associated with ‘failed states’. 
My findings indicate that, although there are a number of factors that exacerbate 
the challenges related to truth commission implementation, two political conditions in 
particular play a central role in determining a commission’s success: the de-legitimization 
of the state and political fragmentation.  Surprisingly, the existence of these conditions in 
Sierra Leone appears to have largely derailed that truth commission’s efforts to achieve 
the objectives outlined in its mandate.  Conversely, their absence in Liberia seems to have 
allowed its commission to operate relatively free of political impediments, leading to 
greater success.  These results raise a number of fundamental questions related to the 
organization of power and its relationship to justice in post-conflict societies or weak 
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states.  Indeed, as will become clear, the paradox presented by the Sierra Leonean case, 
where two political conditions that historically have supported truth commissions in this 
case hampered its implementation, is certainly a phenomenon warranting future research. 
While not delving deeply into the practical applications of these findings, their 
implications for our understanding of transitional justice are many.  The ability of two 
cases to yield general policy prescriptions for the myriad cases of weak states across the 
globe is limited, but they do present some preliminary guidelines for determining what 
forms of transitional justice (prosecutions, truth commissions, reparations, etc.) may work 
best in a given case.  I do not wish to imply that, given the favorability of de-
legitimization and political fragmentation, the aim of the transitional justice community 
should be to promote these conditions.  Rather, this thesis simply suggests that we ought 
to think carefully about when and in what context a truth commission can yield the 
greatest possible results.   
I begin this work by placing the Liberian and Sierra Leonean commissions in their 
proper historical context.  In Chapter 1, I review the existing literature on truth 
commissions, highlighting the relevant theoretical debates surrounding their role and 
implementation in post-conflict societies.  Since their popularization in the early 1990s, 
truth commissions have captivated scholars of transitional justice and democratization as 
a novel and more far-reaching approach to attaining justice in contexts where 
prosecutorial measures are untenable. The advantage of truth commissions over trials, it 
is argued, is that they actively play a role in creating and reinforcing the political 
institutions that promote democratic consolidation while preventing future acts of mass 
violence.  Additionally, truth commissions allow governments of failed or failing states to 
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recapture lost ground following conflict.  In a much broader way than trials alone, TRCs 
through their establishment of a more democratic narrative and sweeping 
recommendations provide a foundation for governments to deepen their legitimacy and 
begin the onerous task of rebuilding institutions, possibly leaving the door open for 
prosecutions in the future. 
Nevertheless, legitimate questions remain surrounding the objectives and merits 
of such truth-telling.   For example, there are concerns that, unless it ultimately leads to 
prosecution, all of the pain involved in recounting the horrors of the past will be 
meaningless.  That said, the issues concerning the suitability of truth commissions in 
post-conflict societies cannot be judged solely on theoretical models.  Equally at play are 
numerous political-contextual factors that shape the framework under which the 
commissions operate and shape the makeup of the commission itself, leading, as this 
thesis will demonstrate, to alarmingly dissimilar results.  Focusing on the composition, 
mandates, and execution of truth commissions, Chapter 1 pays special attention to the 
ways the literature argues they have responded to and overcome political constraints.  
The final section of the chapter aims to contextualize these arguments by providing a 
brief review of the most successful commission to date: Argentina, Chile, South Africa, 
El Salvador, and Guatemala. 
Yet, as mentioned above, what makes the Liberian and Sierra Leonean 
commissions unusual is that they were established in contexts of near state collapse, 
where prevailing political conditions may be very different from those described in 
Chapter 1.  The ‘failed state’ context, I argue, produces a number of additional 
constraints that no other truth commissions have encountered.  That the Liberian and 
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Sierra Leonean commissions have shown different results despite both being 
characterized as ‘failed states’ raises intriguing questions about what these constraints 
may be.  The challenge here is that the scholarly community has not reached a consensus 
on what constitutes a ‘failed state’ or, for that matter, on whether the label has any 
practical use.  Chapter 2 reviews and critiques the literature on failed states, while 
suggesting it is far more useful to imagine them as one terminus on a spectrum of state 
strength.   
In this manner, we can more easily identify certain political conditions 
characteristic of what I label ‘weak states’ that may have an impact on the success of 
truth commissions.  That is to say, by understanding state weakness as the product of a 
number of factors, we can potentially isolate those that have the greatest impact on truth 
commissions through comparative analysis.  Thus, the second part of the chapter outlines 
six conditions of state failure most commonly cited by the literature: 1) the de-
legitimization of the state 2) corruption and the deterioration of public services 3) the 
failure of democratic norms 4) widespread human rights abuses 5) political fragmentation 
6) the presence of an international peacekeeping force. 
In Chapter 3, I offer a detailed examination of Sierra Leonean case, providing a 
history of its civil conflict and peace negotiations, and illustrating how—and to what 
extent—these conditions emerged.  I then examine the circumstances surrounding the 
establishment of the truth commissions of each country in order to identify which 
political conditions had the greatest impact.  Despite exhibiting a number of conditions 
related to state weakness following the war, the Sierra Leonean state maintained high 
levels of legitimacy and succeeded in spurning political fragmentation.  These 
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accomplishments, however, ultimately presented a number of obstacles for that country’s 
truth commission by allowing a small group of state actors led by former President 
Kabbah to establish the Special Court for Sierra Leone, a prosecutorial mechanism that 
undermined the truth commission at every turn.  
Applying the same framework in Chapter 4, I compare Sierra Leone to Liberia.  
In this case I find that, while presenting many of the same weak state conditions as the 
Sierra Leonean state, the Liberian state possessed the additional characteristics of de-
legitimization and political fragmentation.  By significantly reducing the power of the 
Liberian transitional government, I argue that these conditions reduced the number of 
obstacles confronted by the truth commission and created a space for members of the 
legislative body to give it a more progressive mandate. 
Although it is impossible to predict the precise implications of these results, I 
assert that they have the potential to better inform the international community, and in 
particular scholars and practitioners of transitional justice, as they seek to refine their 
approaches to conflict resolution, national reconciliation, and democratic consolidation.  
Indeed, if we are able to identify more concretely which conditions are most favorable to 
these commissions, that information can aid societies newly-emerged from conflict 
(Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, or perhaps even Iraq) in selecting the most 
appropriate approach to redressing past wrongs, conserving scant resources and avoiding 
unnecessary bloodshed.   
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Chapter 1: Truth Commissions and Political 
Constraints 
 
Memory is a kind of accomplishment, a sort of renewal, even an initiation, since the spaces that it 
opens are new places inhabited by hordes heretofore unrealized, of new kinds—since their 
movements are towards new objectives (even though formerly they were abandoned). 
                                                                                        - William Carlos Williams, Patterson 
 
Introduction 
 
There are few contemporary political entities that generate as much political contestation 
as truth commissions.  The hotly disputed debates that surround them range from the 
sublime and ideological to the logistical and mundane.  What should the role of a truth 
commission be?  How should it be run?  What ought to be included (or excluded) from its 
mandate?  What factors influence these decisions?  I begin this chapter with a review of 
the theoretical and practical debates surrounding truth commissions, paying special 
attention to the role of political constraints in determining their structure and, ultimately, 
their success.  I then contextualize these debates in a brief review of the five most 
successful examples of truth commissions to date: Argentina, Chile, South Africa, El 
Salvador, and Guatemala.  In completing this evaluation, I underscore the dearth of 
scholarly work that focuses on how, and which, political constraints play a deciding role 
in poising a truth commission for success within a context of utter state collapse; a gap 
that this paper will hopefully begin to fill. 
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Truth Commissions and the “Truth vs. Justice” Problematic  
 
Transitional justice, according to Naomi Roht-Arriaza , is “anything that a society does to 
deal with a legacy of conflict and/or widespread human rights violations”.1   As she 
herself admits, such a broad definition covers a broad range of strategies and practices. 
Falling within this category are trials and, in more recent years, truth commissions.2   
The emergence of truth commissions as a transitional justice mechanism was by 
no means certain.  The 1945 Nuremburg Tribunals both established a rudimentary legal 
language for combating human rights abuses and introduced a methodology for dealing 
with these abuses that centers on prosecutions.3  For many years this approach 
experienced a great deal of success.  The 1961 trial of Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem, 
while deeply unsettling for many scholars, was the natural extension of the precedents set 
in Germany.  Further, the International Criminal Tribunals in the former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda continue to build on the tradition of these ad hoc courts.4  However, successful 
cases of prosecution have occurred in a context of foreign occupation or extradition, 
where political stability is, to some extent, guaranteed.  The limitations of the 
prosecutorial approach began to emerge in the 1970s as authoritarian regimes across the 
globe crumbled and many countries began a painful process of democratic transition.  
Frequently, there was a great deal of international and domestic pressure for these 
countries to confront the atrocities committed by their former regimes, but shaky 
                                                 
1
 Roht-Arriaza, Naomi. “The New Landscape of Transitional Justice”. in Transitional Justice in the 21
st
 Century: Beyond 
Truth Versus Justice. Ed. Naomi Roht-Arriaza & Javier Mariezcurrena. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006 p. 2 
2
 Zalaquett, Jose. “Confronting Human Rights Violations Committed by Former Governments: Principles Applicable 
and Political Constraints” in State Crimes: Punishment or Pardon Aspen: Aspen Institute, 1989  
3
 Zalaquett, Jose. “Balancing Ethical Imperatives and Political Constraints: Dilemma of New Democracies Confronting 
Past Human Rights Violations.” Hastings Law Review. 43:6 (August 1992)  
4
 Buergenthal, Thomas. “Truth Commissions: Between Impunity and Prosecution”. Transcript from Frederick K. Cox 
International Law Center Lecture in Global Legal Reform, Case Western University School of Law (2006) 
-13- 
 
transfers of power between dictatorship and democracy made prosecutions impossible.  
Truth commissions, the majority of scholars agree, emerged from this impasse. 
Beyond a general consensus on the origins of truth commissions, however, the 
scholarly community has shown little agreement on the role they should play within a 
particular society.  The literature has been characterized by an ideological tug of war 
between those who downplay their importance, arguing that they are ‘second-best’ 
options and mere accessories to a prosecutorial campaign, and those who favor them as a 
true alternative to prosecution capable of fostering broader accountability in societies 
undergoing a rocky transition.  
In the early years of democratic transition, governments regarded truth 
commissions as “second-best” options for situations when prosecutorial measures were 
unavailable or, given the fragility of most post-conflict societies, politically untenable.5  
Charles Call asserts that “such commissions, by necessity pursue what is possible rather 
than the unattainable but righteous path”.6  “Justice,” as Jonathan Allen succinctly puts it 
“becomes the casualty of political calculation”.7  This emphasis on political expedience 
as the modus operandi of truth commissions reflects the underlying fear that they will 
undermine the eventual prosecution of major human rights violators.  It reflects a view 
that prosecutions are of the utmost importance in a transitioning society as they 
purportedly strengthen state institutions, demonstrate compliance with international law, 
foster accountability, and send a clear message to perpetrators that their acts will not go 
                                                 
5
 Allen, Jonathan. Balancing Justice and Social Unity: Political Theory and the Idea of a Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission. University of Toronto Law Journal. 49 (1999); Call, Charles T. “Is Transitional Justice Really Just?” Brown 
Journal of World Affairs. 9:1 (Summer/Fall 2004);  Roht-Arriaza, Op cit. 
6
 Call, Charles T. “Is Transitional Justice Really Just?” Brown Journal of World Affairs. 9:1 (Summer/Fall 2004) p. 103 
7
 Allen, Op cit. p. 315 
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unpunished.8  Other scholars suggest that allowing major violators to go free is a 
demoralizing prospect, but that it is premature to place ultimate value on one form of 
justice over another.  Indeed, despite emerging under inauspicious circumstances during 
messy periods of transition, truth commissions historically have sought to establish 
themselves as serving ends of their own rather than simply offering alternatives to 
prosecution.   
These arguments constitute a rather narrow understanding of what transitional 
justice can or should accomplish.  Allen asserts that justice ought, to some degree, to be 
“forward-looking”.9  Alexander Boraine takes a more expansive approach, envisioning 
transitional justice as a much “deeper, richer, and broader form of justice” that focuses on 
more than just perpetrators.10  In this light, criminal courts such as the ICTY or the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone do not possess more or less legitimacy than any other 
mechanism.  They simply constitute “realpolitik in another form”.11 
Justice Albie Sachs, a chief architect of the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission echoes this claim.  He reminds us that justice need not be 
retributive, coming exclusively through trials and concentrating on punishment, but can 
be restorative, paying respect to victims and working toward national reconciliation.12  
“Truth commissions,” adds Priscilla Hayner, “should not be seen as a replacement for 
prosecutions, nor as a second-best, weaker options when ‘real’ justice is not 
                                                 
8
 Huyse, Luc. “Justice after Transitions: On the Choices Successor Elites Make in Dealing with the Past”. Law and Social 
Inquiry.  20:1 (Winter 1995); Orentlicher, Diane F. “Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations 
of a Prior Regime”. Yale Law Journal. Vol. 100; Santiago Nino 
9
 Allen, Op cit. p. 326 
10
 Boraine, Alexander L. “Transitional Justice: A Holistic Interpretation”. Journal of International Affairs. 60:1 
(Fall/Winter, 2006) 
11
 Ibid. p. 18 
12
 Ibid. 
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possible…On the contrary [they]…positively contribute to justice and prosecutions”.13  
Truth commissions, she continues, represent a more democratic approach to transitional 
justice by directly involving the public in the healing process.  In this light, it matters less 
whether a commission will lead to speedy prosecutions for past offenders than whether it 
allows a society to begin taking ownership of its violent past.  By actively playing a role 
in creating and reinforcing the political institutions that prevent mass violence truth 
commissions may be better suited to improving state strength than any trial could be.  
Martha Minow argues that by opening the process of national healing to the public “the 
truth commission can help set a tone and create public rituals to build a bridge from a 
terror-filled past to a collective, constructive future”.14  
This “constructive future” has often required difficult compromises.  The South 
African Commission, for instance, has demonstrated that forging national consensus on 
the ‘truth’ generally hinges on state contrition.  In many cases factual details matter less 
than the state publicly acknowledging its complicity or participation in wrongdoing, 
sharing in the country’s grief and making substantive efforts to redress past injuries.  This 
may come at the cost of some disagreeable concessions that underscore the inadequacies 
of truth commissions with respect to political housecleaning.  Unlike prosecutions, truth 
commissions cannot guarantee that past offenders, particularly those still in power, will 
not live on without punishment, creating the potential for a “terrifying culture of 
impunity”.15  Nevertheless, citing the conditional amnesty process pioneered in South 
                                                 
13
 Hayner, Priscilla B. Unspeakable Truths: Facing the Challenge of Truth Commissions. New York: Routledge, 2002 p. 
88 
14
 Minow, Martha. Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History after Genocide and Mass Violence. Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1998 p. 89 
15
 Mendez, Juan E. “Accountability for Past Abuses”. Human Rights Quarterly. 19:2 (1997); Opotow, Susan. 
“Reconciliation in Times of Impunity: Challenges for Social Justice”. Social Justice Research. 14:2 (June, 2001) p. 150; 
Seils, Paul F. “Reconciliation in Guatemala: The Role of Intelligent Justice”.  Race and Class. 44:1 (2002) 
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Africa in which major violators were pardoned in exchange for their testimony, Minow 
argues that the “[truth commission] turned the promise of amnesty, wrested from political 
necessity, into a mechanism for advancing the truth-finding process”.16  Essentially, 
justice in one form was sacrificed for justice in another. 
Allen also suggests that “justice-related objections” to truth commissions are  not 
objecting to political compromise, but rather are fundamentally concerned with the moral 
implications of opting not to prosecute certain perpetrators (as was the case in South 
Africa).17  Put in these terms it may be possible for advocates of truth commissions to 
skirt these objections by portraying justice as but a single point in a moral universe that 
also values “reconciliation, peace, and the common good”.  Yet, as many of the scholars 
reviewed here have demonstrated, truth commissions do not inherently represent a 
forfeiture of justice.  Rather, Allen continues, they act under a form of “principled 
compromise” where justice may be weakened in the face of other values, but it is not 
expunged entirely.18 
Truth commissions ultimately demand re-evaluation of our traditional 
understandings of truth and justice.  Provisional amnesty that releases perpetrators from 
strict legal accountability may come as an insult to some, but the absence of formal 
prosecution does not necessarily release them from broader public accountability.  There 
is a difference between a grant of clemency that follows an open and honest account of 
the truth and an amnesty designed to bury it.19  A separate concern is that there is no 
guarantee that the truth, as documented by the commission, will mirror the truth as 
                                                 
16
 Minow, Op cit. 57 
17
 Allen, Op cit. p. 321 
18
 Ibid. p. 325 
19
 Popkin, Margaret & Roht-Arriaza, Naomi. “Truth as Justice: Investigatory Commissions in Latin America”. Law & 
Social Inquiry. 20:1 (Winter 1995) 
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experienced by individual victims.  (In fact there is a strong possibility that it will not).  
But does this necessarily undermine the overarching goals of national healing?  In these 
cases, Minow argues for a distinction between “historical truth”, concerned more with the 
factual details of conflict and state terror, and “psychological truth”, which focuses on 
broader more emotional themes.20  Sachs makes a similar argument, comparing what he 
calls “microscopic truth” to a broader “dialogical truth”.21 
Clearly, the extant literature on truth commissions taps into many deep 
philosophical debates on the nature of justice, psychological healing, and national 
reconciliation.  But these debates do little to explain how a truth commission becomes a 
viable option in the first place.  This thesis, while informed by the above arguments, will 
attempt to step back from the philosophical debates in order to analyze the practical 
matters that allow for the creation of an effective truth commission. If we are to accept 
that these commissions appear during times of political transition, when the old and new 
regimes are struggling to preserve or consolidate power, then we must also address the 
ways that these power struggles create conditions that limit and shape their options.  As 
the literature demonstrates, these political conditions regularly carry over to dictate how a 
truth commission, once established, may operate.   
The next section reviews what the literature says about the role of political 
conditions in shaping truth commissions.  It then illustrates the evolution of thought 
among scholars and policymakers about these conditions through a brief review of what 
are commonly hailed as the most successful commissions to date: Argentina, Chile, South 
Africa, El Salvador and Guatemala.  Hayner argues that these are “illustrative” 
                                                 
20
 Minow, Op cit. 
21
 Boraine, Op cit. p. 21 
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commissions due to their size, the level of national and international attention they 
received, and their impact on the country’s transition.22  Through these cases, I draw out 
the key factors that allowed the commissions to remain viable despite considerable 
pressures against them.  These factors will then provide a framework for approaching the 
Liberian and Sierra Leonean cases, allowing us to begin identifying what types of 
constraints caused Sierra Leone’s commission to wither into obscurity while poising 
Liberia’s for success. 
 
What Should a Truth Commission Look Like? 
 
Truth commissions occupy a unique space in the field of transitional justice.  Freed from 
focusing on punishing the main offenders of the previous regime, they compile past 
human rights abuses for public reckoning, creating a common historical lens for 
addressing the challenges of national reconciliation.  Generally speaking, this involves a 
process of collecting statements from victims on their experiences under the previous 
regime and producing some form of official report.  Moreover, by demonstrating a 
willingness to confront the past, they seek to endow the new regime with greater political 
legitimacy.23  Hayner identifies four central components typical of most truth 
commissions: 
1. They focus on the past. 
2. They maintain a broad perspective “[attempting] to paint the overall picture of certain 
human rights abuses, or violations of international humanitarian law, over a period of 
time”. 
3. They “usually exist temporarily and for a pre-defined period of time, ceasing to exist 
with the submission of a report of [their] findings”. 
                                                 
22
 Hayner (2002), Op cit. 
23
 Hayner, Priscilla B. Fifteen Truth Commissions -1974-1994: A Comparative Study. Human Rights Quarterly. 16:4 
November, 1994 pp. 597-655; Ratner, Steven R. & Abrams, Jason. S. Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in 
International Law: Beyond the Nuremburg Legacy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001 
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4. Finally, truth commissions are usually bolstered by some form of government 
sponsorship “[allowing them] greater access to information, greater security or 
greater protection to dig into sensitive issues, and a greater impact with its report” 
often stemming from their ability to include specific recommendation to the 
government (Hayner, 1994).24 
 
Ratner & Abrams build on this definition, elaborating four specific objectives for truth 
commissions: “(1) creating an authoritative record, (2) providing redress and a platform 
for victims, (3) making recommendations for reform and (4) establishing accountability 
for perpetrators”.25  To these characteristics, Popkin & Roht-Arriaza add the additional 
criterion of political independence.26  While nearly every truth commission to date has 
derived its authority and received a great deal of its funding from the state, their 
executive panels are composed of individuals not directly involved in governance; they 
attempt to develop their reports and recommendations with as objective a lens as 
possible.  As Ratner & Abrams put it, “government-sponsored…must not mean 
government-controlled”.27 
 While most governments have adopted these principles more or less universally, 
the actual composition of truth commissions has varied considerably.  Commissions 
benefit from a great deal of conceptual malleability, allowing them to operate 
successfully in a broad array of contexts.  According to the literature, these divergences 
generally occur along three dimensions: the composition of the commission (who 
administers it), the scope and strength of its mandate, and the execution of its duties.   
 
Commission Composition 
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Thomas Buergenthal, the American representative at the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) and Chief Commissioner of the Salvadoran commission, identifies three types of 
truth commissions: (1) international commissions run entirely by members of the 
international community; (2) mixed commissions, managed by a combination of 
international and national actors; and (3) national commissions, consisting entirely of 
domestic representatives.28  Each type, he argues, has its own benefits and drawbacks.  
International and mixed commissions, best characterized by El Salvador and Guatemala 
respectively, are often the most useful in cases of civil conflict where it is difficult to find 
impartial domestic commissioners.  Further, foreign arbitrators can often offer legal 
expertise unavailable in the country in question, instilling a sense of confidence in both 
victims and government, allowing international commissioners greater access to archives 
and other sources of sensitive information.29  Additionally, it is often too dangerous for 
domestic representatives to oversee such a project, as was evident in early truth 
commissions in Chad and Uganda, whose commissioners fled the country.30 
However, because of their distance from the conflict, international commissioners 
also run the risk of being less sensitive to the fragile nature of post-conflict societies.  
They risk alienating the population, undermining the investigation process, and de-
legitimizing the commission as a whole.31  These “sovereignty sensitivities” make 
commissions run by foreign experts susceptible to criticism from opponents.32  National 
commissions, in contrast, carry greater legitimacy within the country and can often be 
more effective in ensuring accountability and strengthening institutions following the 
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publication of the commission’s report and recommendations; domestic commissioners 
do not pick up and leave once their work is complete.33  Finally, an intimate knowledge 
of the country is often a plus in putting forward a comprehensively researched report that 
makes appropriate recommendations given the context.  Problems of this nature came up 
frequently in El Salvador where “many of those who knew [the country] best were kept 
out of the process”.34   
There is some confusion within the literature about which type of composition 
preferable. Buergenthal leans toward national commissions, but only where the political 
transition is supported by broad national consensus, or when the previous regime has 
wholly withdrawn from the political arena.35  Yet, two of the most prominent national 
commissions, Argentina’s CONADEP and Chile’s Rettig Commission, were established 
in contexts where vestiges of authoritarian rule continued to influence every aspect of 
government.  Further, the South African commission emerged from a political climate 
where national consensus following the apartheid regime was spread quite thin.   Indeed, 
given considerations of sovereignty and legitimacy, if the objective of the truth 
commission is broader than simply accruing a body of evidence to support the 
condemnation of human rights violators, national commissions have sometimes proven to 
be the superior option.  Perhaps the strongest conclusion we can draw from the literature 
to date is that the efficacy of a particular composition is heavily context-dependent.    
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The Mandate 
 
The mandates of truth commissions have varied widely. Most narrowly, it can lay out a 
skeletal mission to collect evidence, produce a report, and make recommendations.  At 
their broadest, the mandate can call for a sweeping investigation, granting powers of 
subpoena and discretionary amnesty, and make binding recommendations.  From a 
practical standpoint, where a specific commission falls in relation to these extremes 
hinges largely upon the timeframe of the investigation, the length of the mandate, and the 
available resources.36   
For example, the chronically under-funded Bolivian commission was hard-
pressed to conclude its mandate; meanwhile the Guatemalan Historical Clarification 
Commission was charged with the daunting task of investigating all human rights 
violations that occurred during its thirty two-year civil war, but was only given a six-
month mandate.  Conversely, the South African TRC was also given a thirty-year 
window of investigation, but received an annual stipend of $18 million and a more 
comfortable two to three years to complete the project.  Indeed, “time pressure may be 
the most difficult aspect of a truth commission’s work”.37  The ability to obtain sufficient 
time and resources can greatly affect the outcome of the commission.  When resources 
are insufficient, a commission will often limit itself to investigating specific types of 
human rights abuses.  A contributing factor to South Africa’s success was that, despite 
the myriad abuses of the apartheid era, it narrowed its focus to incidents of torture, 
extrajudicial killings, abductions, and “severe ill-treatment”.38   
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In situations of civil conflict, there is the additional question of whether to focus 
exclusively on the abuses of the government or offer “balanced treatment”, focusing on 
opposition forces as well.39  In some cases available resources may only allow for the 
investigation of the former regime, but this comes with the potential sacrifice of 
perceived independence.  In either case, what to leave in a mandate and what to exclude 
is a decision not to be taken lightly.  Relative to population size the incidents of murder 
and torture may be few; if the aim of the commission is to promote national 
reconciliation it must consider subtler, more pervasive forms of cruelty. 
 In addition to logistical considerations, the identification of perpetrators has 
thorny political and legal implications.  Naming names can have profound effects on a 
transitional society.  In some cases where there is little risk of retaliation it can be an 
excellent way to foster accountability and purge the new regime of its shadier elements.  
However, it is equally common that political expedience demands that the names of 
violators be kept confidential to avoid undermining a fledgling transitional government.40   
Additionally, naming names raises a number of concerns related to due process.  
Douglas Cassel offers a biting critique of the Salvadoran commission’s decision to 
publish the names of perpetrators, pointing out that it trampled the rights of the accused 
to know and question their accusers and defends themselves before a competent court.41  
This type of legal calculus stems largely from the presence (or lack thereof) of other 
judicial bodies in the country in question.  The extent to which a truth commission will 
highlight the actions of individual perpetrators is contingent upon the existence and vigor 
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of other judicial bodies.42  In El Salvador, the decision to name names is often justified as 
the only viable way to create accountability due to an utter lack of confidence in the 
judiciary’s capacity to render an uncorrupted verdict.43   
Considering the number of factors that influence a mandate, a truth commission’s 
success may seem to be based on little more than a serendipitous confluence of good 
timing, abundant resources, and favorable political and legal conditions.  To some extent 
this is true, but it does not explain why many of the most frequently hailed commission 
arose from less than favorable circumstances.  To answer that question, we turn from 
individual factors to questions of procedure. 
 
Questions of Procedure 
 
How should a commission carry out its mandate while respecting the political fragility of 
the country in question?  Most commissions hold a great deal of discretion as to when, 
where, and how they act.  Powers of subpoena and search and seizure, for example, are 
often components of more progressive mandates, but the literature suggests that they 
must be exercised with caution so as not to upset the delicate balance of power that exists 
in most transitional societies.    
 Similarly, truth commissions must decide on the extent to which they will 
publicize their work.  In some cases, such as South Africa, they have gone to great 
lengths to open up the process to the public, assuming that broader participation would 
promote collective healing and engender a sense of national unity.  In other cases, 
however, prudence has called for more private hearings so as not to upset an unsteady 
peace or to ensure the security of the victims.  Hayner notes that public hearings risk 
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making victims too fearful of reprisal to testify.  Moreover, she is hesitant to accept the 
principle that collective healing is the sole rationale of public hearings, arguing that they 
most likely serve the more subversive purpose of discrediting the old regime, crassly 
using the commission hearings as a form of propaganda.44 
 Finally, the dissemination of reports is an often overlooked, but equally important 
consideration.  Like so many other aspects of truth commission operation, this is 
essentially a question of context and should be decided through a careful assessment of 
the likely impact of the report on society.45  This implies not only evaluating the potential 
political backlash, but also such fundamental factors as the country’s literacy rate and 
access to mass media.46  After all, 10,000 published reports or televised hearings mean 
little in a society unprepared to access them.  From a practical viewpoint all of this is 
ultimately dependent on staffing and resources.  Holding public hearings across the 
country and broadcasting them on television may seem an excellent idea when you have a 
staff of hundreds and an ample budget, but perhaps less so, as in the case of Honduras, 
when the commission’s operations were, for all intents and purposes, limited to the 
investigative capabilities of Leo Valladares, the country’s Human Rights 
Commissioner.47 
 
Truth Commissions in Historical Context 
 
Truth Commissions in Times of Transition:  The Cases of Argentina and Chile 
 
The first experiments with truth as a component of transitional justice occurred in the 
midst of the tumultuous period of regime change and democratization (or re-
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democratization) of the 1970s and 80s.  Within this uncertain global context, concerns 
over logistics and implementation played a deciding role in truth commission 
development.  In the early years of the ‘third wave’, this was evidenced by the fact that of 
all the authoritarian regimes that began to democratize during this period (Spain, Italy, 
Portugal, Greece, Argentina, and Chile, to name a few) only a handful (Argentina and 
Chile being the most prominent cases) established truth commissions. It is necessary to 
touch on these questions briefly within the framework of the Argentine and Chilean cases 
in order to better understand how, when, and why truth commissions first appeared.   
Between 1976 and 1983, Argentina endured the most viciously executed period of 
state terror in its history.  The ruling military junta, led by Rafael Videla, launched an 
expansive project of economic and political liberalization while purging the country of 
leftist opposition under the hauntingly prosaic title of El Proceso de Reoganización 
Nacional (el Proceso).  Throughout this period, known as Argentina’s ‘Dirty War’, mass 
disappearances were common as the state took individuals deemed subversive into state 
custody and tortured and killed them.  Given the sheer brutality of the Videla regime a 
successful putsch from the opposition seemed wholly untenable.  Yet in the turbulent 
aftermath of Argentina’s humiliating defeat to Great Britain in the Falkland Islands War, 
even a government built on absolute oppression could no longer contain the groundswell 
of discontent from below.  By 1983 the junta was forced to abdicate direct rule to civilian 
control. 
As Argentina’s newly-elected president, Raul Alfonsín, took power, his options 
for redressing the wrongs of the ‘Dirty War’ were limited.  A pragmatic leader with 
strong ideals, upon taking office Alfonsín enthusiastically launched a plan to prosecute 
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members of the junta.  Keeping closely in mind the principle of due obedience, he 
proposed to focus on two categories of perpetrators: high-ranking military leaders who 
were the chief architects of the Proceso and low-level members of the armed forces who 
personally carried out the acts of terror.  However, Alfonsín was also deeply cognizant of 
the fact that sustained pressure from former military rulers (who still held considerable 
sway in the country) might ultimately derail the prosecutions and was eager to 
accumulate a body of evidence that could be made public, undermining their push for 
impunity.  Therefore, he moved forward with the establishment of the Comisión Nacional 
sobre la Desaparición de Personas (the National Commission for Disappeared People or 
CONADEP).  
Established on December 29, 1983 and headed by Ernesto Sábato, a prominent 
writer and vocal critic of the Videla regime, CONADEP (also known as the Sábato 
Commission) was given a broad mandate to investigate past human rights abuses, 
including access to official records and clandestine state detention centers and the ability 
to gather statements from victims.  Nunca Más: Informe de la Comisión Nacional sobre 
la Desaparición de Personas, its final report, documented over 9,000 disappearances; the 
Commission itself filed 1,086 cases of human rights abuses with the judiciary.48  
Unfortunately the armed forces, initially reeling following their defeat in the Falklands, 
regrouped and were able to block or overturn the majority of prosecutions by pressuring 
the Alfonsín government to grant military courts jurisdiction over the cases. 
The general consensus among scholars in the years following the Argentine 
transition was that investigatory commissions such as CONADEP were a product of 
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political expediency.49  This position gained sway in 1989 when Chile began its 
democratic transition.  Unlike Argentina, Chile’s military regime under Augusto Pinochet 
remained quite strong throughout the process and was able to dictate their terms for its 
cession of power.50  After taking power in March of 1990 President Patricio Aylwin had 
few options for exacting justice and moved to order the creation of the Comisión para la 
Verdad y Reconciliación Nacional (National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation, 
or the Rettig Commission).  “Aylwin’s choice hinged on a calculation,” asserts Pion-
Berlin, “that the military’s response to the Commission’s findings would be negative, yet 
measured—stopping far short of a praetorian intervention”.51  Nevertheless, his long-term 
objective was to use the findings of the Rettig Commission’s report to undercut the 
amnesty laws enacted to protect members of the Pinochet regime.  Aylwin assumed that 
public outcry after hearing the truth regarding the disappearances and other human rights 
abuses under Pinochet would be sufficient to push prosecutions through the courts, legal 
barriers notwithstanding.52 
Closely modeling CONADEP, the Rettig Commission moved forward with its 
work, despite strong opposition from within the government and almost no cooperation 
from the military, publishing its 1,800-page report in February 1991.  The Informe Rettig, 
documented 2,920 cases of human rights abuses, attributing 95% of these to government 
forces and 4% to leftist guerilla opposition.  Hayner notes that the report “[debunked] one 
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of the central arguments used by the military to justify its violent tactics, that the country 
had faced an ‘internal war’ that thus demanded significant force against opponents”.53  
Sadly, a rise in national disquietude following a series of political assassinations 
prevented the report from receiving the same visibility as the Argentine commission. 
Nevertheless, both commissions succeeded in promoting national reconciliation 
and disseminating knowledge about the abuses of the former regime.  With respect to 
prosecution, Nunca Más aided the trials of several ranking members of the Videla 
government. A shorter version of the report was published and released to the general 
public; selling 40,000 copies its first day and 150,000 copies in the first two months, it 
has become one of the best-selling books in Argentina’s history.  Likewise, although the 
Informe Rettig was never widely publicized (the majority of copies were mailed directly 
to families of victims with a letter from President Alywin), it led to the prosecution of 
several military leaders.54  Additionally, the Rettig Commission initiated the National 
Corporation for Reparations and Reconciliation, an organization that has archived the 
data of the report for public access and continues to provide financial support to families 
of the victims of the dictatorship to this day.  True, justice was not served in the strict 
legal sense of prosecutions, but these commissions nonetheless played an integral role in 
reshaping society after more than a decade of state terror. 
In the years following the Argentine and Chilean commissions many other nations 
emerging from periods of violence began to adopt truth commissions not as a mere 
complement to prosecution, but rather as the centerpiece of their own democratic 
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transition.  The most noteworthy of these was the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission. 
 
Justice Re-Envisioned: The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
 
Like Argentina and Chile, the South African Commission was formed during a period of 
political transition and democratization.  However, the similarities stop there.  Unlike the 
Videla and Pinochet regimes, which largely controlled the manner of their own demise, 
the apartheid government was faced with a mounting and ever more sophisticated 
opposition.  Low-intensity conflict between state security forces, paramilitaries, the 
African National Congress and other opposition factions had been the norm in South 
Africa for several decades.  The extremely tenuous hold the apartheid government had 
over the country in its final years meant that a peaceful transition was far from certain, 
and many were preparing for open revolt and civil war.  In this volatile context, the newly 
elected South African government chose to eschew prosecution in favor of the broader 
vision provided by the truth commission model. 
The first to adopt the moniker ‘TRC’ (Truth and Reconciliation Commission), the 
South African commission, the Commission was formed by parliament in the 1995 
Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act.  It was given a sweeping mandate 
and broad jurisdictional powers, including the right to subpoena and seize evidence by 
force. The Commission was staffed by 300 personnel (just 60 people worked on the 
Rettig Commission) and endowed with an annual budget of $18 million, effectively 
“dwarfing previous commissions in size and reach”.55 
                                                 
55
 Hayner (2002), Op cit. 
-31- 
 
A controversial feature of the South African TRC was its power to grant 
conditional amnesty.  The dominant position of the ANC in South African politics 
following the transition presented every opportunity to try and punish major violators 
from the apartheid government, and quite a number of its members were keen to do so.  
However, fearing that too aggressive a policy might plunge the country back into 
violence, parliament agreed that prosecution should come only at the Commission’s 
discretion. Guided tactfully by Archbishop Desmond Tutu, the Commission pursued a 
truth-for-amnesty scheme in which human rights abusers from the apartheid government, 
its paramilitary supporters, and the militant wing of the ANC would be protected from 
prosecution only if they registered an application with the Amnesty Committee and 
provided a satisfactory account of their actions for the public record.  The fact that 
allegations of misconduct came from both members of the apartheid government and the 
ANC seems to indicate that the Commission succeeded in maintaining its independence. 
For many scholars, the South African TRC was an immense success.  That the 
country was able to transfer power peacefully from a government bent on the 
marginalization of black Africans to a multiethnic democracy in the midst of widespread 
violence is often lauded as a political miracle.56  As a fundamental component of the 
transition, the TRC rested on a razor’s edge, striving on one hand to confront and punish 
the horrors of the past while, on the other, struggling to avoid plunging the country into 
civil war.  Considering the near impossibility of this task, the incredible display of 
pragmatism by its leaders is commendable; it is a truth commission that should be hailed 
as much for its restraint as its progressivism.   
                                                 
56
 Sparks, Allister. Beyond the Miracle: Inside the New South Africa. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003 
-32- 
 
Nevertheless, many have remained critical of the Commission, arguing that it 
prioritized reconciliation over truth.57  Indeed, the TRC’s decision not to apply its powers 
of subpoena to such high-profile individuals as members of the South African Defense 
Force, the ANC, the Minister of Home Affairs, or Mangosuthu Buthelezi, the President 
of the Inkatha Freedom Party, seems to demonstrate that political constraints continue to 
be influential even within institutions designed to circumvent them.  Granting clemency 
to major human rights abusers following their testimony came as a slap in the face to 
many of their victims.  But did these decisions truly undermine the TRC’s mission?  
21,000 people testified before the Commission, 2,000 in public hearings which the 
national radio service broadcast for four hours each day.  Every major newspaper ran 
countless articles on its activities, and a weekly television show titled Truth Commission 
Special Report was the most watched program in South Africa.  Through its intense and 
public scrutiny, it tainted the political careers of many prominent leaders, including 
Winnie Mandikizela Mandela.  Never has a society participated so fully in its own 
transition.   
 
Truth Commissions and Civil Conflict: El Salvador and Guatemala 
 
The Salvadoran and Guatemalan states of the late 1980s and early 90s were even more 
unstable than Argentina, Chile, or South Africa.  Unlike the countries mentioned above, 
political conflict and transition in El Salvador and Guatemala did not end in a relatively 
peaceful transfer of power from military to civilian hands or the expansion of democratic 
franchise after three decades of protracted insurgency.  Rather, transition in Central 
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America only came after years of open conflict and human rights violations unrivaled in 
scale and brutality.   
Extending from 1980 until 1992, the Salvadoran Civil War between the country’s 
rightist military government and the Faribundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) 
killed over 180,000 people, most of whom were civilians.  Psychological warfare was a 
tactic common to both sides. FMLN guerillas attempted to subdue rural areas through 
village raids and the kidnapping and murder of those suspected to be orejas (ears, or 
traitors).  Additionally, by the late 80s, state-led terror campaigns, carried out mainly by 
death squads in unmarked vans and culminating in the assassination of Archbishop Oscar 
Romero, had reached levels unparalleled by even the Videla regime in Argentina.58  To 
the northwest, Guatemala was experiencing an even more brutal civil conflict.  There, 
warfare between government forces and the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union 
(UNRG) guerillas had been nearly constant for thirty six years.  During the worst years of 
the conflict from 1978 to 1984 General Efrain Rios Montt began his “scorched earth 
counteroffensive”, pushing rebels into the Guatemala’s mountainous interior and 
unleashing what has been labeled a “virtual holocaust” against the country’s large 
indigenous population.59  Between 1981 and 1983 alone, it is estimated that the 
government killed 150,000 civilians in the fighting.  Nevertheless, by the early 1990s the 
conflicts in both countries had worn down and been replaced by grudging peace accords 
and a protracted period of democratization.  In both the 1992 Salvadoran peace 
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agreement and the Guatemalan 1994 Framework Accord, the warring parties agreed to 
establish truth commissions to investigate the atrocities of the past decades. 
Unlike those in Argentina, Chile or South Africa, the Central American 
commissions were more international in nature.  The Salvadoran Comision de la Verdad 
(Commission of Truth) was mandated by the United Nations.  Its commissioners, Judge 
Thomas Buergenthal, former Colombian President Belisario Bentancur, and former 
Venezuelan Foreign Minister Renaldo Figueiredo, were charged with the task of 
investigating all human rights violations that took place during the war and making 
recommendations to the new Salvadoran government in their final report.60  The 
Guatemalan Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico (Historical Clarification 
Commission or CEH) was a hybrid institution managed by one international jurist, 
Christian Tomuschat, who then appointed two Guatemalan experts on law and indigenous 
affairs, Alfredo Basells Tojo and Otilia Lux de Cotí.  While, covering a much broader 
timeframe (from 1962 to 1996) the CEH’s mandate varied little from El Salvador’s 
commission. 
Although the mandates were uncomplicated in language, they proved to be quite 
complex in practice.  Both commissions encountered difficulties collecting statements 
from victims who were legitimately fearful of reprisal.  This was particularly true in El 
Salvador where FMLN holdouts still occupied parts of the countryside and were not 
enthusiastic about the prospect of being named in the commission’s report.61  Standing in 
stark opposition to South Africa, statement taking in El Salvador became a clandestine 
operation involving shadowy rooms and hushed voices.  Likewise, in Guatemala 
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obtaining civilian and government cooperation was often difficult and testimony was 
gathered confidentially.  As Popkin and Roht-Arriaza point out, while the Salvadoran 
military ended the war in a stalemate with the FMLN, the Guatemalan armed forces 
considered the peace accords a testimony to their victory and were far less inclined to 
make concessions that would aid the CEH.62 
Considering the obstacles to their work, both the CEH and the Commission of 
Truth achieved several important successes in the name of national reconciliation.  In El 
Salvador, the commission succeeded in registering 22,000 complaints, 85% of which 
were against the military regime.  Further, the commission used the added heft provided 
by its international backing to counter precedent and move forward with naming the 
names of suspected perpetrators in its final report, including Major Robert D’Aubuisson 
who ordered the execution of Archbishop Romero.63  Faced with growing consternation 
from many members of his government when word broke that they would be accused in 
the report, President Alfredo Cristiani opted not to comply with the majority of the 
commission’s recommendations.  However, the Salvadoran Supreme Court has not 
precluded future prosecutions for many of those named by the report. 
In Guatemala, the military’s stronger position in government effectively ruled out 
any hope of naming names in Memorias de Silencio (Memories of Silence), the final 
report.  Nonetheless, the CEH did document 42,275 incidents of human rights abuses, 
attributing 93% of them to the armed forces.  Further, it established that 83% of the 
victims were of Mayan origin and officially classified the 313 massacres committed by 
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government forces between 1982 and 1983 as “acts of genocide”.64  While keeping a low 
profile throughout its investigation, the CEH formally released Memories of Silence in 
1999 in a nationally broadcast ceremony at the National Theater in Guatemala City.65  
Shortly thereafter, President Bill Clinton offered a formal apology for American 
involvement in the conflict.66 
As these cases demonstrate, in environments of open conflict special measures 
may be necessary to preserve a commission’s chances for success.  Neither El Salvador 
nor Guatemala was able to operate as openly or publicly as South Africa or the Southern 
Cone.  Given the continued presence of major human rights violators in both 
governments, state contrition has been harder to come by.  That being said, by playing to 
their strengths the commissions are still widely regarded as exemplary.  Taking full 
advantage of their international support, the Commission of Truth and the CEH were able 
to conduct thorough investigations despite considerable resistance.67  Perhaps more 
importantly, Hayner and Buergenthal indicate that the commissions were successful 
because they frequently chose to act boldly rather than reticently, taking calculated risks 
in spite of hot-tempered and unpredictable opposition.68 
 
Conclusion 
 
As truth commissions evolve from subsidiary bodies to larger justice projects, the 
intellectual debate has shifted to how they can succeed under less than perfect conditions.  
Through this historical review we can develop a better understanding of how truth 
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commissions are able respond to political constraints.  Further, we begin to establish what 
elements must be present in these commissions for them to become truly beneficial 
institutions within their unique political milieu.  The literature suggests that these 
elements include: a high public profile (both domestically and internationally), adequate 
size and staffing given the mandate, and sufficient independence to make calculated 
decisions that balance political expedience and ethical imperatives.   
That said, I should note that the conditions required for a successful truth 
commission vary across the range of cases.  When we compare the commissions 
described above, we find that the level of state strength in each case is different, a factor 
that in certain contexts allowed them to act boldly and in others required that they make 
certain concessions.  Sábato and Alfonsín in Argentina, for instance, were able to 
pressure the military to grant the commission access to detention centers and confidential 
records.  The commission was able to do this largely because it understood that, while the 
armed forces might balk at the suggestion, they would not openly rebel and chance the 
erosion of the Argentine state.  Moreover, the South African TRC was able to take full 
advantage of the strong institutions and high levels of bureaucratic capacity (particularly 
among juridical bodies) left over from the apartheid regime to support a large and 
logistically complex operation. 
Conversely, the El Salvadoran and Guatemalan commissions could not count on 
the same level of governmental support.  In both cases, they had to reach out to the 
international community for logistical support and judicial expertise.  Further, because 
the consolidation of the El Salvadoran and Guatemalan states was far more tenuous than 
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in Argentina, Chile or South Africa, the commissions had to operate discretely.69  This 
seems to suggest that while the manner in which commissions negotiate political 
constraints has an important role in determining truth commission success, additional 
conditions that arise in contexts of state strength may also have a part to play.  I address 
this question in greater detail later in the paper. 
At any rate, based on the information provided by the above cases, we now have a 
basic framework for approaching Liberia and Sierra Leone.  The truth commissions in 
these countries operated and are continuing to operate in a volatile and fragile political 
climate wholly unlike that of any other commission to date.  The Liberian and Sierra 
Leonean states are so weak that identifying the specific conditions that impacted their 
truth commissions’ outcomes demands that we consult the literature on ‘failed’ states, as 
literature on truth commissions in this context is, for all practical purposes, nonexistent.  
The next chapters thus examine these two cases in greater detail with the objective of 
evaluating the applicability of the framework created by past truth commissions actions 
in contexts of mass violence and state collapse. 
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Chapter 2: Deconstructing Failed States 
 
 
People go to Africa and confirm what they already have in their heads and so they fail to see what is 
there in front of them. This is what people have come to expect. It's not viewed as a serious 
continent. It's a place of strange, bizarre and illogical things, where people don't do what common 
sense demands. 
                                                                                 -Chinua Achebe 
 
Introduction 
 
In Chapter 2 I highlighted many of the theoretical and practical debates that continue to 
rage over truth commissions.  Through this review, I demonstrated how the success of 
truth commissions depends greatly on their ability to navigate and overcome political 
constraints.  Yet while prone to many of the constraints described in Chapter 2 (political 
opposition, composition, funding etc.) the Liberian and Sierra Leonean commissions are 
unusual in that they operated in a political climate far more volatile than any previous 
case; prior to Sierra Leone, a truth commission had never been attempted in a failed state 
context.  Indeed, the paucity of formal political structures in post-conflict Liberia and 
Sierra Leone (contrasted with the strong, militarized state that was the primary obstacle to 
Argentina’s commission, for example), suggests that these cases face a number of unique 
challenges to their implementation.  How can a truth commission establish itself as a 
credible institution in a political space where key institutions lacks legitimacy?  How 
does a truth commission thrive or survive in a climate of endemic corruption, intense 
political fragmentation, and the nebulous maneuverings of international peacekeeping 
forces?  Most importantly for this thesis, how do these conditions shape the outcome of 
truth commissions?  These questions, among many others, are not yet addressed in the 
literature.  As much of the conflict and bloodshed of the twenty-first century is pushed 
toward the periphery, into the world’s ungoverned or ungovernable places, understanding 
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the capabilities as well as the limitations of truth commissions in these environments is 
essential to their continued viability. 
The purpose of this chapter is twofold.  I begin with a brief review of the 
literature on failed states, tracing its evolution from regarding them almost exclusively as 
chaotic threats to international security to more nuanced interpretations.  The conception 
of failed states that I use in this thesis is somewhat different.  The myriad efforts by the 
literature on ‘failed states’ (most of which is generated by international relations scholars) 
to characterize these bodies makes it clear that state failure is better understood not as one 
side of a binary state, but as one terminus on a spectrum of state weakness.  In this sense, 
we can understand Liberia and Sierra Leone as existing in the same political universe as 
Argentina, Chile, South Africa, El Salvador, and Guatemala, but possessing certain 
characteristics that place them further along the path to collapse.  This understanding 
allows us to begin isolating specific conditions that contribute to state weakness while 
also influencing the success of a truth commission.  These conditions will establish the 
basis for comparison between the two cases in this study.  Thus, in the second half of the 
chapter I highlight those political constraints most associated with failing states whose 
presence (or absence) may assist in explaining the Liberian and Sierra Leonean 
commissions’ divergent paths. 
 
Theorizing Failed States 
 
‘Failed state’ emerged as a political classification and phenomenon in the opening years 
of the 1990s, following the end of the Cold War.  Many states in the developing world, 
previously locked into the power struggle between the United States and the Soviet 
Union, were suddenly cast adrift with scant resources, bureaucratic institutions, or 
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government infrastructure.70  After years of being propped up by one superpower or 
another, governments throughout Africa and other regions in the South could not 
guarantee economic or political stability.71   
As the post-Cold War years progressed, an increasingly liberalized global 
economy has exacerbated the problem by exposing weak states to the whims of their 
more powerful neighbors and international institutions.72  As these states struggled to 
catch up with the developed world, they often found themselves hobbled by austerity 
measures, stringent privatization demands, and requirements that they open their 
economies to foreign capital imposed by transnational institutions like the IMF, World 
Bank, and WTO.  Almost uniformly, the response to these pressures has been increased 
poverty and political instability, leading to crumbling economies and collapsed regimes.  
As Robert Rotberg explains, these governments were no longer capable of delivering 
“positive political goods” to their constituencies.73  Indeed, in Liberia and Sierra Leone, 
along with many other states, “government…lost its minimal capacity and therefore its 
right to rule”.74    
Much of the early literature presents a bleak outlook on the prospects of failed 
states.  Most scholars understood these states primarily as threats to international 
security.75  The ensuing “civil strife, government breakdown, and economic privation” 
risked allowing these states to act as platforms of “random warfare” and widespread 
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human rights abuses, producing destabilizing refugee flows and drawing entire regions 
into a chaotic vortex.76  Perhaps best encapsulating the fearful zeal with which scholars 
initially approached these ‘benighted’ regions is Robert Kaplan’s 1994 article The 
Coming Anarchy which describes the future of West Africa as a post-apocalyptic 
nightmare where “disease, overpopulation, unprovoked crime, scarcity of resources, 
refugee migrations, the increasing erosion of nation-states and international borders, the 
empowerment of private armies, security and international drug cartels…provide an 
appropriate introduction to the issues…that will soon confront our civilization”.77 
However, many scholars are critical of this interpretation.78  The disquieting neo-
colonial subtext of Kaplan’s article aside, they have argued that by portraying failing 
states as threats to international security or anarchic civilizational frontiers, we are doing 
little more than re-invigorating the age-old practice of orientalism, carving our fears and 
prejudices into the landscape of the developing world and constructing the ‘failed state’ 
as a new form of ‘other’.  Lancaster and Opala have expressed concern that what the 
Western world has labeled statelessness is in reality the messy post-colonial process of 
indigenous institution building.79  In a similar vein, Hoffman & Weis are skeptical of the 
usefulness of the term ‘failed state’ altogether.80  They contend that, irrespective of how 
these states are defined, what is “shared across the categories is a type of order that 
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deviates from textbook patterns, but is still premised on structured arrangements among 
actors representing political, military and economic power”.81 
The point is that there is astonishingly little analytical rigor to early scholarly 
interpretations of failed states. States with diverse political histories and populations are 
uniformly and insensitively portrayed as lacking some critical component that makes 
them civilized.  While fundamentally true that a state without a legitimate sovereign 
authority cannot effectively manage all of its responsibilities, and disorder in one state 
threatens the stability of its neighbors, the myriad political conditions that contribute to 
this loss of power or legitimacy, as well as the forces that emerge in the vacuum, demand 
individual analysis in order to identify those factors that weaken the state.  Once we begin 
to identify these factors weak statehood is more usefully understood as a continuum 
rather than a static condition, where a government’s monopoly over sovereignty is but 
one of many variables; that is to say, “failed states are not homogenous”.82  Langford 
agrees, asserting that “as no two situations are alike, crystallizing an operational 
definition [of failed state] is difficult”.83 
Bearing this in mind, scholars have searched for ways to more accurately describe 
failed states.  Rotberg distinguishes between “failed states” that suffer from a progressive 
decline in the legitimacy of the central authority and “collapsed states” that “exhibit a 
[total] vacuum of authority”.84  Helman & Ratner group vulnerable or weakening states 
into the three rather ambiguous categories of “failed states”, “failing states”, and states 
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“whose viability is difficult to assess”.85  Following this trend, Germain-Gros lays the 
groundwork for a “taxonomy of failed states” that acknowledges the diverse conditions 
under which a state can fall into a retrograde political trajectory.   In a nuanced, albeit 
sometimes opaque, review of political conditions in Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda, and Haiti, 
he offers five types of failed state ranging from “anarchic states” where centralized 
government is does not exist (Liberia) and the almost mystical “phantom or mirage state” 
that projects the image of a central authority that does not in fact exercise any control 
over its territories (Zaire).  Additionally, there is the “anemic state” where authority is 
shared between two or more competing groups (Haiti), the “captured state” where the 
state apparatus is hijacked by a single elite faction in order to eliminate their rivals 
(Rwanda), and finally the “aborted state” that “experienced failure even before the 
process of state formation was consolidated” (Bosnia).86 
The trouble with this type of characterization is that it ignores a rather glaring 
contradiction.  On one hand, lumping states into categories assumes that state failure is 
common enough to warrant taxonomy.  On the other hand, the growing number of 
categories required to house these cases (“anemic state”, “phantom state”, etc.) seems to 
indicate that we are not, in fact, dealing with an expanding universe of atomized events, 
but rather are witnessing the elaboration and refinement of a spectrum of state strength 
(or weakness).  The question, then, is not “has a state failed or not?” but rather “to what 
extent has a state failed, and how?”  
As we strive to lay out a set of factors to guide our analysis of the Liberian and 
Sierra Leonean cases, the dichotomies presented in the early literature on failed states are 
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not particularly useful.   But as we begin to conceptualize states in terms of relative 
strength or weakness, and to identify the characteristics that define positions on this 
continuum, we discover factors shared by states characterized as failing.   Many of these 
factors could play crucially important roles in fostering or inhibiting the development of 
post-conflict institutions such as truth commissions.  In this light, we can locate Liberia 
and Sierra Leone in relation to other cases while remaining cognizant of their unique 
positions in terms of state weakness.  Moreover, by positioning these cases in a more 
nuanced literature on failed states, we can begin to more legitimately isolate common 
political conditions that may have played a role in deciding the outcome of their truth 
commissions.  In addition, we are identifying a group of states to which the results of our 
analysis are potentially transferable. 
Beyond offering competing typologies, scholars’ characterizations of failed states 
tend to vary even within a single context.  Somalia, regarded by many as the 
“quintessential failed state”, has been described with both profound pessimism and quiet 
optimism.87  Lyons and Samatar view Somalia’s current plight as the result of a long and 
arduous process of political decline that “left behind little but the wreckage of distorted 
traditions and artificial institutions”.88  Conversely, Menkhaus and Prendergast point out 
that, rather than being condemned to the inchoate anarchy and violence predicted by 
Kaplan, Somalia has proven surprisingly resilient, with community level political 
structures emerging to carry out many of the functions of central government.89  Peter 
Little adds that Somalia has maintained a vigorous informal economy comparable to the 
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more formalized economies of its neighbors; all of this despite having existed without a 
central government for over a decade.90   
While some failed states have settled into a more or less normalized existence 
without a central authority, statelessness should not be understood as a permanent or 
intractable condition.91  Indeed, to assume that statelessness precludes significant 
political, economic, or social activity plays into the generalizations that I have attempted 
to complicate above. Liberia and Sierra Leone, despite entering the decade in utter 
disarray have slowly begun restoring the elements of legitimate central government.  
Drawing from the journal Foreign Policy’s Failed States Index (FSI), which ranks states 
from 1 (signifying the greatest jeopardy) to 60, Figure 2.1 shows a consistent 
improvement in the political consolidation of both countries since 2005.92  The Brookings 
Institution, opting for the categorization of weak states rather than failed states, ranked 
Liberia 9th and Sierra Leone 13th out of 141 countries in 2008.  The inconsistencies, both 
in how we label troubled states and how we measure their weakness reflect the general 
lack of clarity in the literature on this topic.  Failed states are what we make them. 
Figure 2.1: FSI Ranking for Liberia and Sierra Leone 2005-2008 
 Liberia  Sierra Leone 
FSI Ranking 2005 9
th
  6
th
  
FSI Ranking 2006 12
th
  17
th
  
FSI Ranking 2007 27
th
  23
rd
  
FSI Ranking 2008 34
th
  31
st
  
Source: Fund for Peace, Foreign Policy Magazine (Failed States Index) 
 
As we strive to lay out a set of factors to guide our analysis of the Liberian and 
Sierra Leonean cases, the dichotomies presented in the early literature on failed states are 
not particularly useful.   But as we begin to conceptualize states in terms of relative 
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strength or weakness, and to identify the characteristics that define positions on this 
continuum, we discover factors shared by those existing closer to the weak terminus.93  
Returning to the indices offered by Foreign Policy and the Brookings Institution, both 
rank weak of failed states by measuring a variety of indicators or political conditions that 
such states typically exhibit; the more conditions that are present, or the more acutely 
they manifest themselves, the weaker the state.  Many of these individual conditions 
could play crucially important roles in supporting or inhibiting the development of post-
conflict institutions such as truth commissions.  In the following section, I evaluate these 
political conditions in greater detail.  
 
Deconstructing Failed States  
 
There are many indicators of state weakness and they are endlessly debatable.  
Depending on their particular field of interest, scholars have suggested that the origins of 
state failure can be traced back to flaws within colonial administration or to modern 
economic mismanagement, while others point to the slow erosion of democratic norms.94  
It is well beyond the scope of this study to weigh in on this debate.  However, 
understanding state weakness as the product of a number of separate, but interrelated 
conditions allows us to examine the relationship between weak states and truth 
commission success in a more nuanced manner.  Adopting a similar framework as the 
indices described above and drawing from the literature, the potential constraints to truth 
commissions operating in failed state contexts that will be examined in this study are the 
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following: 1) the criminalization or de-legitimization of the state 2) corruption & the 
deterioration of public services 3) the failure of democratic norms 4) widespread human 
rights abuses 5) political fragmentation and 6) the presence of an international 
intervention force.  These conditions listed below were chosen for two reasons. First, 
based on the literature they are more or less common to all cases of state failure.  Second, 
they are perhaps the most categorical and thus the least problematic for comparative 
analysis—the presence of an international intervention force, for example, is not prone to 
definitional ambiguities.  In addition to drawing indicators from the literature, this thesis 
borrows heavily from both the Failed States Index and the Index of State Weakness, as 
they have compiled the most comprehensive sets of indicators of state failure to date.95 
Figure 2.2 Indicators of state weakness 
1. De-legitimization of the state 
2. Corruption & deterioration of public services 
3. Failure of democratic norms 
4. Widespread human right abuses 
5. Political fragmentation 
6. Presence of an international intervention force 
 
The de-legitimization of the state: In order for a state to cease to function it must 
experience a loss of legitimacy in the eyes of its population.  There is a broad consensus 
within the literature positing de-legitimization as a primary warning sign of state 
collapse.96  This generally occurs when, through a painful period of de-colonization, 
political re-shuffling/instability, or economic restructuring/turmoil, the state cannot carry 
out its duties to its constituency.97  A loss of legitimacy is in some ways a product of the 
following 3 conditions, but it is a consequential and measurable factor in its own right. 
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 State legitimacy, when translated into political power, can be related in complex 
and paradoxical ways to the prospects for success of post-conflict institutions and 
transitional justice mechanisms.  On one hand, the absence of state legitimacy poses 
serious challenges to any form of political consolidation or reconciliation as the state is 
acting without popular consent.  That is, de-legitimization essentially immobilizes state 
actors by severely restricting their political capital.  A lack of respect for state institutions 
and the resultant turmoil can be anathema to the development of the legal and extra-legal 
institutions required for democratic consolidation.  On the other hand, the existence of 
state legitimacy does not necessarily guarantee the success of a reconciliation process 
either.  As demonstrated by the cases of Argentina and Chile in the previous chapter, a 
strong central authority with great legitimacy could explicitly oppose or tacitly derail the 
reconciliation process should it appear to threaten their continued hold on power.  When 
unchecked by powerful competing institutions and endowed with sufficient political 
capital, legitimate state actors can undermine national reconciliation. 
Corruption & deterioration of public services:  In some cases, the de-
legitimization of the state comes through the corruption of ruling elites (FSI, 2008).  
Rotberg (2003: 8) explains that while “corruption flourishes in many states…in failed 
states it often does so on an unusually destructive scale”.  By diverting public money into 
overseas coffers, receiving kickbacks from public works projects and government 
programs, or converting bureaucratic institutions into private patronage machines (all of 
this in addition to run-of-the-mill bribery), government officials experience a decline in 
credibility among the general population.  In authoritarian states, or those that are only 
nominally democratic, there are few mechanisms capable of transforming the grievances 
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of irate constituencies into political change, further undermining the regime’s legitimacy.  
The immense plutocracy that characterized the final days of the Siaka Stevens 
administration in Sierra Leone, for instance, was a principal contributor to that country’s 
decline into civil war.98   
These kinds of corruption are frequently tied to the deterioration of public 
services.99  Corruption necessarily diverts government funds from the upkeep of basic 
infrastructure such as roads and bridges, but also threatens the availability of basic 
necessities, including water and electricity.  Additionally, in cases of costly protracted 
conflict the state will unlikely be able to expend sufficient resources on these projects.   
Indeed, the inability of a state to provide basic services generates a lack of trust among its 
constituents that reverberates across many arenas.100 
Failure of democratic norms: Many states lose legitimacy and ultimately ‘fail’ 
due to a deterioration or lack of democratic institutions.  As mentioned above, when 
citizens lose access to government or cannot effectively lobby for political change the 
resulting alienation can ultimately lead to the establishment of competing institutions that 
undercut the state’s authority.  Menkhaus and Prendergast and Little assert that a key 
challenge to the restitution of statehood in Somalia is the reversion to local level (and 
generally clan-based) institutions that have taken on a state-like role following the Barre 
administration’s collapse in 1991.101 
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 Widespread human rights abuses:  Human rights abuses are another principal 
contributor to a decline in the legitimacy of a state.  That said, human rights abuses are by 
no means a guarantor of state failure.  Argentina and Chile did not collapse despite 
enduring campaigns of state terror against dissidents.  What is unique to failed states, 
however, is the extent of human rights abuse as well as the actors responsible.  During the 
conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone (two contexts where human rights abuses reached 
unparalleled levels), the central government was not the sole participant in mass abuses; 
rather it was but one actor in a country that had been overtaken by endemic violence.  
Neighbors were killing neighbors.  Thus, through implicit or explicit complicity, or 
through its sheer inability to maintain order, the legitimacy of the central authority is 
undercut.  The sheer multitude of actors and the convoluted networks of responsibility 
that arise in the aftermath of particularly bloody civil conflicts pose special challenges to 
truth commissions, adversely altering the dynamics of implementation, composition and 
the strength of the mandate.   
Political Fragmentation:  While some level of political fragmentation, understood 
as the existence of a number of distinct (and occasionally armed) political factions, is 
natural in any society, it can become a major hindrance to states where the central 
government is struggling to consolidate power and where opposition groups are often 
armed.  Jochen Hippler explains that in countries where armed groups are “not only 
competing politically but also fighting among themselves…the bi-polar structure of a 
conflict will be transformed into a multi-polar structure and the danger of a complete 
social breakdown is high”.102  Indeed, he continues “a multitude of independent armed 
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groups fighting the government and simultaneously one another tends to ‘depoliticize’ a 
conflict and emphasize narrow group interests over national interests”.103  Further, when 
a civil conflict splinters along ethnic lines (as it did in Bosnia, Afghanistan, Somalia and 
Liberia) the potential for continued domestic conflict increases considerably.104  
Considering the challenges it presents for democratization, the potential troubles 
that political fragmentation poses for democratic consolidation are quite evident.  
Fractured or myopic conceptions of national interest possessed by various warring 
factions are likely to rule out sweeping national reconciliation projects, particularly when 
these factions stand to lose credibility in the process.  Walter asserts that the “greatest 
challenge [to a democratic transition] is to design a treaty that convinces the combatants 
to [take steps] that will increase their vulnerability and limit their ability to enforce the 
treaty’s other terms”.105   
Presence of an international intervention force: A final indicator of state failure 
that may hold consequence for a truth commission is the presence of an international 
intervention force.  International intervention in a civil conflict or humanitarian crisis can 
have a profound impact on political consolidation and democratization by adding another 
layer of intrigue to an already complex political environment and, moreover, calls into 
question the authority of the state.106  Further, international intervention may have the 
adverse effect of prolonging the conflict or crystallizing it in a limbo-like state.107 This 
risk is heightened in cases where the international actor is from the region and may have 
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an intense interest in the occupied country’s domestic affairs, making them virtual 
playing fields for pushing agendas and settling old scores.108  
  
Conclusion 
 
This chapter reviews the literature on failed states in an attempt to complicate common 
perceptions of state weakness.  Having realized that the label ‘failed state’ alone does not 
possess a great deal of descriptive power, scholars have struggled to attach a number of 
additional qualifiers, ranging from ‘collapsed state’ to ‘anemic state’.  The result has been 
to atomize ‘failed states’ into seemingly infinite sets of categories and subcategories.   I 
contend that this process is indicative of a broader misconception about how these 
‘benighted’ states relate to their more stable counterparts.  That is, rather than 
understanding state failure as a binary condition, I argue that it is far more useful to 
imagine it as one terminus on a spectrum of state strength.   
In this manner, we can more easily identify certain political conditions characteristic 
extreme state weakness that may have an impact on the success of truth commissions.  
Further, this approach allows us to examine these states in relation to one another, telling 
us more about which conditions have the greatest impact on truth commissions.   
As I mentioned above, what makes the Liberian and Sierra Leonean commissions 
unusual is that they were established in precisely this type of context.  Yet while both 
countries are typically described as ‘failed states’, their respective truth commissions 
experienced markedly different levels of success, thus indicating that there were some 
differences in the political conditions present in each case.  Indeed, in cases of extreme 
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state weakness, many of the political constraints described in Chapter 1 may not be 
present while other, new conditions may play a deciding role.  In Chapters 3 and 4, 
therefore, I attempt to do two things.  First, after reviewing the Sierra Leonean and 
Liberian conflicts, I will identify which of the political conditions outlined above 
appeared in each case.  Second, looking closely at the events surrounding both the 
creation and the implementation of the truth commissions in both countries, I evaluate 
which of these conditions had the greatest impact on their success as defined by their 
respective mandates. 
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Chapter 3:  Sierra Leone 
 
Yes, we have committed atrocities.  One day we shall stand before the people and ask for 
forgiveness. 
                                                                                                                              - Foday Sankoh 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The civil war that raged across Sierra Leone from 1991 to 2002 was one of the most 
horrifying events in African history.  Following years of political decline and a slow 
erosion of democratic institutions, the conflict ostensibly began as a violent outpouring of 
public frustration with the slow pace of de-colonization and a desire for deeper 
democratic reform.  However, as the rebel group Revolutionary United Front (RUF) 
became the central voice of opposition, whatever political subtext the war may originally 
have possessed was quickly replaced by unarticulated fury and bitter resentment with the 
status quo which, unfortunately, was often directed at the civilian population.  In addition 
to the tens of thousands killed in the conflict, countless more were scarred by shocking 
acts of cruelty, including rape and sexual violence, amputations, the recruitment of child 
soldiers and forced cannibalism.  In its aftermath, the Sierra Leonean state established 
two institutions designed to spark a process of national reconciliation: the Sierra Leonean 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and the Special Court for Sierra Leone.  
However, only the Special Court appears to have ultimately succeeded in carrying out its 
mandate.  The TRC meanwhile experienced significant challenges in achieving its 
fundamental objectives of accounting for the origins of the conflict and serving as the 
venue for national reconciliation.   
This chapter attempts to account for these shortcomings.  Specifically, I explore 
how certain political constraints created by state weakness were instrumental in 
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determining the Sierra Leonean TRCs reduced success in carrying out its mandate.  I 
begin by reviewing the Sierra Leonean conflict and explaining how the war and 
subsequent peace accords led to the emergence of many of the political conditions laid 
out in Chapter 2.  Looking at events surrounding the creation of the Commission and the 
Special Court as well as the relationship between the two bodies, I then discuss the 
failings of the TRC in greater detail, identifying connections between the shortcomings of 
the latter and the political conditions associated with the weakness of the Sierra Leonean 
state.  Ultimately, I argue that while many of these political conditions did present 
challenges to the Commission’s work they did not significantly undermine its objectives.  
Counter intuitively, the absence of two of these conditions (de-legitimization and political 
fragmentation) appears to have dealt the killing blow to the Commission by empowering 
the Sierra Leonean state to move forward with the special Court.  This act proved to be 
insurmountably problematic, as the Special Court prevented the TRC from 
communicating with many high-profile individuals involved in the conflict and 
engendering doubt among the country’s population regarding its true motives.  In 
essence, the strengths of the Sierra Leonean state jeopardized the work of the 
Commission. I elaborate on this claim extensively later in the chapter.  First, however, it 
would be useful to account for the events that led to the creation of these institutions. 
 
Origins of the Conflict: 1961-1991 
 
Although armed conflict in Sierra Leone began in 1991, its roots stretch back to the early 
years of de-colonization.   The United Kingdom relinquished control of the country 
leaders thirty years earlier in 1961, following a gradual transfer of administrative 
responsibilities over the previous decade.   In parliamentary elections the following year, 
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Sir Milton Margai, a shining star of the Colonial Medical Service and candidate of the 
Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) was elected Prime Minister only to die two years 
later, leaving his brother, Sir Albert Margai, as his successor.  Sir Albert’s administration 
was met with criticism from the beginning.  A member of the Mende ethnic group, he 
was accused, legitimately, of dolling out favors and political patronage to his ethnic 
cohort as well as attempting to establish a one-party state.  Tainted by this scandal, 
Margai was ousted by the All People’s Congress (APC) and British Governor-General 
accepted candidate Siaka Stevens, then the Mayor of Freetown, as the country’s new 
Prime Minister in 1967.109   
This was far from a model transfer of power, leading to a coup d’état in which 
Stevens and Margai were arrested.  After a second coup, re-established Stevens was re-
established as the legitimate leader of the country in 1968.  Perhaps more than any other 
political figure, he was responsible for Sierra Leone’s descent into chaos.  A charismatic 
leader who had emerged onto the political scene out of Freetown’s trade unions, he 
initially enjoyed a great deal of popular support, particularly among the Temne and 
Limba ethnic groups, as well as the smaller populations of Mandingos, Lokos and Susus, 
for his leftist, anti-colonial rhetoric.  However, shortly after taking office, Stevens 
abandoned much of his leftist agenda and began laying the groundwork for what would 
become a massive, and massively corrupt, political machine.110  By 1980, Stevens’ 
personal wealth was estimated at roughly $500 million U.S.  His years of corrupt 
leadership were punctuated by the infamously lavish 1980 Organization of African Unity 
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(OAU) summit in Freetown, the cost of which was rumored to match the annual 
expenditures of the entire country.111   
 Throughout the 1980s the Sierra Leonean economy experienced a precipitous 
decline.  Diamond revenues, which in 1968 had accounted for nearly $200 million U.S., 
barely reached $100,000 in 1985, as “a motley crew of adventurist rogues and shady 
Israeli firms” took over the resource’s production and export.112  Meanwhile, spending 
on education declined from 15.6% of the national budget in 1975 to 8.6% in 1988.  
Health care and housing spending also dropped from 6.6% and 4.8% to 2.9% and 0.3% 
respectively over the same period.113 
 Amid swelling popular discontent, Stevens abdicated in 1985, passing the 
presidency to his army chief of staff, General Joseph Momoh.  Momoh, however, 
proved to be a far less competent leader than Stevens.  In 1987, when it was discovered 
that Stevens was preparing to assassinate the new President and re-take office, Momoh 
placed him under house arrest, where he died soon afterward.114  Nevertheless, the 
economy continued its downward slide and citizens expecting a change were vocal in 
their disappointment.  Under pressure, President Momoh amended the constitution in 
October 1991, returning the country to a multi-party system. 
 It was too little, too late.  Earlier that year in March, a small band of roughly 300 
Sierra Leonean rebels, supported by ‘special forces’ units from Liberian rebel leader 
Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) and Burkinabe 
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mercenaries, and calling themselves the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone 
(RUF) appeared in the provincial town of Bomaru, Kailahun District after slipping 
unnoticed across the border from Liberia.115  A second force entered the country from 
the southwest a few days later.  One of the bloodiest conflicts in African history had 
begun. 
 
Papa’s War: 1991-2002 
 
Much of the literature on the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone characterizes them as a 
single, cross-border conflict and to some extent this is true.116  After all, it was Charles 
Taylor who bankrolled the RUF during their first incursions in Sierra Leone and provided 
military support throughout the conflict.  Perpetuating a state of war in Sierra Leone was 
economically advantageous for Taylor because, with Sierra Leone in disarray all diamond 
exports had to be funneled through Liberia.117  Yet while there are many ways in which 
these two conflicts were linked, they were nonetheless distinct events with markedly 
different trajectories.   
 Foday Sankoh, the leader of the RUF, was an ex-corporal in the Sierra Leonean 
army who, after being imprisoned and discharged by Stevens following a failed coup 
attempt in 1973, had begun a career as a professional photographer. An older man (he 
was fifty four when the war began) who was called ‘Papa’ by his troops, Sankoh had 
trained in Libya with Taylor in the late 1980s where he networked with a number of 
prominent West African revolutionaries.  However, he shared little of ideological 
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aspirations common to his radical cohort.  From the very onset the RUF’s political 
ambitions were vague, drawing almost at random from Qaddafi’s Green Book along with 
a smattering of Mao Zedong; they conveyed little more than an unarticulated desire to 
end the corruption and incompetence of APC.  The rebels had no intellectual leader and 
there was no central planning committee; the entire operation was loosely organized 
around Sankoh and his compatriots, Abu Kanu and Rashid Mansaray.118  The lack of a 
clear goal hindered the RUF’s ability to build a constituency in the countryside, a 
challenge that was exacerbated by the group’s brutal tactics.  Sankoh’s forces, and 
particularly his captains Papa Kamara and Sam Bockarie, regularly raped, murdered, 
tortured and mutilated the inhabitants of rural villages.  The image of children whose 
hands had been chopped off by rebels became the most harrowing symbol of the conflict. 
Ironically, the support Sankoh did receive was the direct result of economic 
decline under the Stevens administration.  By the early 1990s, Sierra Leone possessed a 
vast sector of unemployed youths, most of whom were secondary school drop-outs or 
college graduates unable to find work.  Left with few other options, most of these youths 
made a living through the informal economy, smuggling diamonds, weapons and 
narcotics.  This made them easy recruits for the RUF.119  The rest of the rebel group’s 
support came from ‘conscripted’ boys, gathered from rural villages and forced to fight.  
The extensive recruitment of child soldiers (initially by the RUF, but later by the Sierra 
Leonean Army as well) was another hallmark of the civil war and the most evident 
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manifestation of the human rights abuses that had become commonplace throughout the 
country.120 
Despite never winning popular sympathy, the RUF maintained a small following 
and was able to continue in his efforts to seize control of the country for much of the 
decade.  For all his shortcomings as an ideological leader, Sankoh was a brilliant 
strategist and the Sierra Leone Armed Forces (SLA) were too underequipped and poorly 
trained to hold off the rebel advance.  In 1992, frustration with the leadership of President 
Momoh, the SLA seized control of the Freetown government.  The newly founded 
National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC), headed by Captain Valentine Strasser, 
attempted a peace deal with the RUF, offering the possibility of a coalition government.  
Sankoh (allegedly under advisement from his contacts in the NPFL) rejected the deal.121 
 For several years, the RUF continued its methodical progress across the 
countryside.  In 1994, they had taken control of the Sierra Leone’s diamond mines and 
were pressing toward Freetown.  By this point, the SLA outnumbered the RUF by nearly 
10,000 troops.  These numbers were bolstered by a peacekeeping force deployed by the 
Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) and a 
number of civil defense militias called kamajors.122  Nevertheless, the rebel forces gained 
a foothold in the suburbs surrounding the capital.  In 1995, Strasser enlisted the support 
of the South African mercenary outfit, Executive Outcomes, to aid in repelling the attack 
and to retake the diamond mines.  The RUF was severely outgunned and within weeks 
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Sankoh and his army had been pushed back to the borderlands between Sierra Leone and 
Liberia.123 
 This victory was fleeting.  The NPRC was rocked by a January 1996 coup in 
which Brigadier-General Julius Maada Bio replaced Strasser as the NPRC chairman.   
Under pressure from the United States and Great Britain, the confident General Bio 
called for elections later that year; SLPP representative Ahmed Tejan Kabbah won the 
presidency on March 17, 1996.  During his first ten months in office, Kabbah survived 
three coup plots and was regularly criticized at home and abroad for not properly 
managing the conflict.  Nevertheless, by November 1996 he had forced the RUF, 
weakened significantly by the mercenary-led counteroffensive, to accede to peace talks in 
Abidjan. 
 Sankoh’s attitude toward the Ivorian-brokered peace talks was cool at best.  He 
disliked having to leave Sierra Leone and did not trust the UN Special Envoy, Berhana 
Dinka.  In addition Akyaaba Addai Sebo, the NGO International Alert’s representative 
and friend of Charles Taylor attempted to dissuade Sankoh from making concessions or 
entering into any binding agreement.  Still, after months of negotiation, President Kabbah 
and Sankoh were able to strike a tentative deal on November 30, 1996.  The RUF would 
become a political party and its members would receive a blanket amnesty, Executive 
Outcomes as well as all foreign troops would withdraw from Sierra Leone, and Cote 
d’Ivoire would lead a ‘Neutral Monitoring Group’ responsible for the disarmament of 
both parties.124  
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 This agreement was never realized.  It appears that the NPRC’s commitment to 
the accord and the Kabbah administration were not entirely sound.  On March 25, 1996, 
in the days leading up to the transfer of power from military to civilian rule, Sankoh and 
Maada Bio met in Yamoussoukro where the General apparently offered the RUF 
commander either a position in the NPRC or the vice-presidency, depending on whether 
the military decided to allow the elections to continue—promises he was not prepared to 
keep.  Thus, despite formal commitments between Sankoh and Kabbah to continue 
negotiations following the conference, Sankoh’s insistence on the vice-presidency was a 
conversation stopper.  Further, kamajor militias, ostensibly with the blessing of the 
Freetown government, continued raiding RUF camps along the Sierra Leonean border.  
An intercepted message between Sankoh and his commanders revealed that the RUF 
leader had only agreed to the Abdijan accords to buy the rebels more time.  This cast 
doubt on whether Sankoh or President had committed to the ceasefire in good faith.125 
 Any lasting hope of peace was entirely forgotten the following year in March 
1997, when Sankoh was arrested while traveling to Nigeria.  Scholarly accounts of why 
Sankoh had left Cote d’Ivoire differ, but it seems that RUF arms supplies were drying up 
and Sankoh had gone to Lagos to secure a new source.126  The Nigerian authorities, keen 
to destabilize the RUF, held the commander in Lagos until 1999. Meanwhile, in Freetown 
the Kabbah administration was disintegrating.  Incensed by rumors of army downsizing 
and resentful of the President’s reliance on Nigerian bodyguards and the kamajor militias 
for security, junior SLA officers seized control of the government on May 25, 1997.  The 
newly minted Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), led by Major Johnny Paul 
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Koromah, assured Sierra Leoneans in a radio address that its actions were for “the good 
of the country”.127 
In an astonishing turn of events the AFRC invited the RUF into Freetown to form 
a ruling coalition, just hours after taking power.  The RUF seized the opportunity and 
within days its troops spilled into the city, fueling the chaos.  What ensued was a 
protracted and violent battle for the capital between the AFRC/RUF junta, senior SLA 
factions still loyal to Kabbah (who was now living in exile in Conakry), and the Nigerian 
ECOMOG peacekeepers.  While regional and international powers waited anxiously for 
the force to restore peace and attempted to find a diplomatic solution to the crisis, the 
AFRC/RUF or ‘sobels’, as they were labeled by the locals, dug in their heels.  Nine 
months later on February 15, 1998, after several abortive negotiations and the gradual 
rearmament of ECOMOG forces, the AFRC/RUF was forced out of Freetown, killing 
hundreds of civilians in their wake.  Pitched battles between ECOMOG and the sobels 
continued for the rest of 1998.  On January 6, 1999 the RUF began a six-week siege on 
Freetown.  The consequent ECOMOG retaliation, shored up by Nigerian jets and 
warships, destroyed much of the city and killed 3,000 civilians.128   
The fact that the rebels were able to sack Freetown (albeit temporarily) humiliated 
ECOMOG.  Nigeria, as the largest contributor to the Sierra Leonean and Liberian 
peacekeeping missions, was spending nearly US $1 million per day on the conflict and 
could not bear the cost of continued fighting.129  This put a great deal of domestic 
pressure on newly elected Nigerian president, Olusegun Obasanjo, to withdraw from the 
two countries.  Having only recently returned to Freetown, however, President Kabbah 
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was keenly aware that if ECOMOG withdrew all the legitimacy in the world would not 
protect him or his government from a second rebel incursion and began exploring 
diplomatic solutions to the conflict.130  Meanwhile, the AFRC/RUF alliance was rapidly 
deteriorating.  Many of the soldiers had become disenchanted with the collaboration and 
wanted to return home.  Moreover, the RUF had lost nearly 2,000 troops in the battle for 
Freetown, along with much of the scant popular support it still possessed.131   The time 
seemed right for another attempt at peace. 
 
The Lomé Accords 
 
The Lomé Accords were the result of a protracted negotiating process that spanned the 
better part of a year.  Although sporadic fighting persisted across the country, President 
Kabbah and Foday Sankoh, who had been extradited to Sierra Leone in July and was 
facing treason charges, began speaking in person or by telephone almost daily between 
January and March, 1999.  This open line of communication allowed for many small, but 
symbolically important acts, including Sankoh’s release of several captive children and 
his acknowledgement of President Kabbah as the legitimate leader of the country.  It also 
gave Sankoh an opportunity to communicate with his commanders in the field, foreign 
diplomats, and members of civil society who urged him to return to the negotiation table. 
132 President Kabbah even went so far as to take Sankoh on a tour of the most damaged 
areas of Freetown, an event that seems to have softened the rebel leader’s stance. 133 
Yet before formal negotiations could begin, both the Freetown government and 
the RUF needed to convene separately and work out their positions.  After years of 
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fighting with Sankoh behind bars, RUF leadership was showing signs of splintering and, 
while always ambiguous, their political agenda seemed increasingly disjointed.  Thus, 
through UN envoy Francis Okelo and RUF legal advisor Omrie Golley, President 
Kabbah quietly reached out to RUF leadership and agreed to allow Sankoh to travel to 
the Togolese capital of Lomé to hold a consultative “family meeting” with his 
commanders.134  
The RUF meetings convened on April 25, 1999 and lasted for three weeks.  Most 
of the time was spent re-asserting Sankoh’s position as the top commander of the rebel 
group and finding consensus on a common negotiating position.  However, since 1991, 
the rebels had matured in political savvy and immediately began making overtures to the 
leaders of neighboring countries for endorsements.135  Ultimately, the meeting yielded a 
fifty-nine page proposal outlining a number of demands, including a blanket amnesty for 
all AFRC and RUF fighters, the release of all prisoners, a transitional government in 
which power would be shared between the Freetown government and RUF leadership, 
the withdrawal of ECOMOG troops, and the establishment of an independent 
international peacekeeping force.  Further, as a condition for the peace negotiations, 
Sankoh was to be “immediately and unconditionally” released (Rashid, 2000:3).  For 
President Kabbah, the release of Sankoh was a non-starter.  The Freetown government 
had consulted with civil society and reaffirmed its position as the legitimate government 
of Sierra Leone.  Setting the RUF commander free would only undercut their superior 
bargaining position. The peace negotiations, they asserted, would be based on the 1991 
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constitution and the Abidjan and Conakry Accords.  Sankoh, would only be released after 
the RUF signed the peace agreement. 
The Freetown government prevailed.  On May 18, 1999, President Kabbah and 
Sankoh defied expectations by meeting in Lomé to sign a ceasefire agreement.  One week 
later, the talks began.  Representing the Freetown delegation were Attorney General and 
Minister of Justice, Solomon Berewa, Deputy Foreign Minister Sahr Matturi and 
National Security Advisor Sheka Mansaray, among others.  RUF representatives 
included, Omrie Golley, AFRC Foreign Minister, Pallo Bangura and several field officers 
from both groups.136  Protesting Kabbah’s refusal to grant him clemency, Sankoh himself 
did not directly participate in the negotiations, instead passing his days in a local hotel 
and giving interviews to the international press.137  
Compared with the Abidjan Accords, the RUF was now in a stronger bargaining 
position.  They had retaken swathes of the Sierra Leonean interior and had even won a 
few sympathizers in the Freetown government.  Negotiations surrounding the 
humanitarian and military conditions of the peace agreement were therefore conducted 
with relative expediency.  Both parties agreed to allow humanitarian aid into the 
countryside and ECOWAS was pegged to lead a Joint Implementation Committee that 
would oversee repatriation of over 500,000 refugees who had fled to Liberia and Guinea.  
The RUF was also able to secure the same controversial blanket amnesty that they had 
received in Cote d’Ivoire.  Additionally, the Lomé Accord reinstated the defunct 
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Commission for the Consolidation of Peace, and provided a framework for the 
disarmament of all sides and the gradual formation of a new Sierra Leonean army.138 
More contentious was the debate over Sierra Leone’s political future; according to 
Ishmail Rashid, “nothing came closer to scuttling the talks”.139  The RUF, he explains, 
while confident of their strength, “knew that the major obstacle to their entrenchment in 
Freetown had been the presence of a government with both popular and constitutional 
legitimacy”.140  Thus they began the negotiations by stridently demanding a four-year 
unity government with Sankoh as vice-president.  In addition, they wanted the cabinet to 
be expanded to twenty positions, eleven of which they would control, including finance, 
defense, justice, and foreign affairs.  Further, they asked for several diplomatic posts as 
well as the control of eleven parastatal institutions such as the Bank of Sierra Leone and 
the Port Authority.141 
This was simply too much for the Freetown delegation.  Although, Kabbah’s 
representatives agreed in principle on a unity government, they stalwartly opposed giving 
Sankoh the vice-presidency or making any concession that would contravene the 1991 
constitution.  Constitutional legitimacy was the Freetown government’s single greatest 
strategic asset; bringing the rebels into a transitional government on equal footing would 
render their position as the true leaders of the country untenable.142  “Now that just 
doesn’t make sense. It cannot be acceptable,” claimed Julius Spencer, the Sierra Leonean 
Information Minister, referring to the RUF proposal.143 Moreover, without constitutional 
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legitimacy they could no longer count on continued military support from ECOMOG, 
which they desperately needed.   
What followed was over a month of political wrangling and several near 
breakdowns.  Protests rocked Freetown, shutting the city down entirely in mid-June.  The 
RUF, perhaps sensing their weakening position, staged several vociferous and very 
public outbursts in an effort to intimidate their adversaries and regain lost ground.  While 
these tactics succeeded in temporarily stalling negotiations, they ultimately did little to 
change the terms of the final agreement.  Ultimately, both parties settled on an RUF 
allotment of four cabinet positions and four deputy-ministerial positions, Sankoh was 
given a titular vice-presidential position as well as the chairmanship of the Commission 
for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development 
(in essence, control of the diamond mines), and ECOMOG forces would be maintain a 
presence in the country until a UN peacekeeping force (UNAMSIL) could be deployed 
the following year.144  Sankoh’s allies attempted to ease any lingering doubts, 
encouraging the RUF leader to begin thinking of “a transitional phase, rather than a 
transitional government” and convincing Kabbah to grant him a symbolic vice-
presidency.145  After six weeks of talks, the Lomé Peace Accord was signed by both 
parties on July 7, 1999. 
Tragically, the agreement did not immediately precipitate change on the ground.  
Written commitments to Lomé on the part of the international community were never 
realized as actual support.  Conflicts in Kosovo and East Timor had become a distraction 
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and critical financial support for the disarmament quickly dried up.146  Lacking a cash 
incentive, the RUF refused to disarm, openly confronting and capturing hundreds of 
UNAMSIL peacekeepers.  This antagonism precipitated escalation and more hostilities as 
Great Britain deployed a large expeditionary force to bolster the international troops and 
protect increasingly vulnerable Freetown in May 2000.  On May 8, massive protests in 
support of the release of UN troops quickly turned violent as crowds of protestors 
surrounded Sankoh’s home.  The rebel leader cum vice-president escaped by clambering 
over a wall dressed in women’s clothing, but not before his bodyguards had lost control, 
shooting wildly into the crowd and killing seventeen.  Deemed responsible for the 
killings, Sankoh was imprisoned one week later.147  Their leader incarcerated for the 
second time and under growing pressure from a Freetown government now backed by 
12,000 UN peacekeepers, the RUF submitted to a ceasefire in Abuja in May 2001.  On 
January 18, 2002, President Kabbah declared the war officially over. 
This review of Sierra Leone’s civil war and peace process has explored the events 
that contributed to state weakness.  Throughout this long and violent decade, the Sierra 
Leonean state neared total collapse.  Fighting consumed the country, destroying basic 
infrastructure and severely restricting access to public services.  After years of rule by 
various military councils the democratic institutions had eroded, leaving President 
Kabbah with skeletal and inadequate state bureaucracies and a population distrustful of 
government.  This challenge was exacerbated by the fact that, due to stipulations in the 
Lomé Accord, the President did not command a standing army and relied heavily on first 
ECOMOG and then UNAMSIL peacekeepers.  Following years of dubious political 
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maneuverings on the part of West African peacekeepers, many in Sierra Leone were 
apprehensive about who truly was in charge.  In the immediate aftermath of the conflict, 
these were immense challenges to the Sierra Leonean state’s consolidation or, for that 
matter, any attempt at fostering restorative justice.  Nevertheless, in the wake of the 
Sierra Leonean conflict two conditions of state weakness did not present themselves: de-
legitimization and political fragmentation.  As I explain later, this came as a considerable 
boon for the Sierra Leonean government, but posed a momentous challenge to the 
reconciliation process.  The next section describes the materialization of these weak state 
conditions and details how their presence (or absence) may influence the success of a 
truth commission. 
 
The Aftermath of Conflict and Emergent Aspects of State Failure: Sierra Leone 
 
In Chapter 2, I outlined a number of political conditions which I argue are characteristic 
of weak or failing states: de-legitimization of the state, corruption & the deterioration of 
public services, failure of democratic norms, widespread human rights abuses, political 
fragmentation, and the presence of an international intervention force.  Following Sierra 
Leone’s decade-long civil war, many of these conditions emerged, profoundly 
compromising the vigor and structure of the state.  With respect to human rights 
violations, the conflict had killed over 150,000 people, mostly civilians.  In all, two 
million people (roughly one-third of the population) were either internally displaced or 
forced across the border as refugees.148  An entire generation of children (45% of the 
population) has been permanently scarred. 149  At least 5,000 were directly from their 
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participation in the conflict as child soldiers while countless others witnessed or 
experienced incidents of horrible abuse (there are currently 4,000 amputee survivors 
living in Sierra Leone today).150 The sheer scale of human rights abuses committed 
collectively by the RUF, the SLA, and the kamajor militias proved deeply traumatic for 
the majority of Sierra Leoneans.  Rekindling citizen trust in government following such 
horror will prove a daunting task. 
“The [Sierra Leonean] civil war festered in the wounds of colonialism and 
decades of post-independence corruption,” write Nicole Fritz and Allison Smith.151  
Reciprocally, the conflict engendered a favorable climate for the continuation and growth 
of corruption as well as a deterioration of infrastructure and public services.152  A 2003 
study conducted by the World Bank Institute found that roughly 95% of public officials 
polled and 90% of private households cited corruption and poor infrastructure as “key 
problems”.153  By the end of the war, the woeful condition of the country’s roads, 
bridges, electrical grids, etc. reflected over ten years of damage and neglect.  The last 
assessment of the country’s freshwater resources, for example, took place in 1987.  The 
most recent estimate of the size of the country’s workforce is from 1981.  Just .4% of the 
country’s land is irrigated and 8% of its roads are paved.154  After the conflict, access to 
even basic public services such as water and electricity was almost universally 
unavailable and continues to be limited to Freetown and a few other urban centers.  The 
fact that the war left the country essentially bankrupt with few safeguards against 
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corruption was, and continues to be, a formidable challenge to the Sierra Leonean state as 
it attempts to secure financial support, reaches out to rural communities and works 
toward democratic consolidation. 
Political infrastructure was also dealt a serious blow by the conflict.  Although 
Sierra Leone has held several elections during and after the conflict, witnessing the 
successful transfer of power from President Kabbah to President Ernest Bai Koromah in 
2007, democratic institutions were not nearly as robust in the immediate aftermath of the 
conflict.  In the years surrounding the establishment of Sierra Leone’s transitional justice 
mechanisms, strong governing bodies such as an independent judiciary, a strong 
parliament, and other mediums for dialogue and trust-building between state and citizen 
were virtually non-existent.  As I explain below, this made it exceedingly difficult for the 
Sierra Leonean TRC to convince citizens to give testimony, a problem exacerbated by the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone.   
Another key aspect of state weakness that surfaced during the Sierra Leonean 
conflict is the presence of an international peacekeeping force.  During much of the war, 
the Nigerian-led ECOMOG force complicated the conflict by using its presence in Sierra 
Leone to foster a larger project to consolidate its regional hegemony.  During and after 
the war they used their position as the de fact protectors of Freetown to exert political 
pressure on the Sierra Leonean government.155  Yet the ECOMOG force itself also 
became a pawn of international politics.  Canada, for instance, was criticized by 
ECOMOG command for selectively donating medicine and other supplies to the 
Ghanaian and Guinean contingents of the force, but not the Nigerians.156  The result on 
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the ground was an often confused jumbling of domestic, regional, and international 
interests that paralyzed the peacekeepers and left the country vulnerable to greater levels 
of violence.  The situation improved somewhat following the Lomé Accords, when 
ECOMOG began a phased withdrawal in preparation for the arrival of UNAMSIL.  The 
public, however, remained skeptical and questioned who held ultimate authority in 
country.  As Kabbah began working toward transitional justice, the heavy consultative 
role played by the UN left many perplexed as to who these bodies would ultimately 
cater.157 
Deviating from the model of state weakness laid out in Chapter 2 the Sierra 
Leonean case never exhibited widespread political fragmentation.  Indeed, with the 
exception of the rift between junior and senior officers of the SLA and the peripheral 
participation of the kamajor militias, participation in the civil war was limited to two 
primary actors: the Freetown government and the RUF.  During and after the peace 
process, the RUF became discredited as a political actor to the point that the Sierra 
Leonean state had essentially no competitors or significant challengers as it pursued 
political consolidation and national reconciliation. 
Tied closely to political fragmentation, Sierra Leone’s government consistently 
enjoyed high levels of legitimacy in the years immediately after the war.  The failure of 
the RUF to articulate a coherent political agenda or develop a local constituency due to 
their indiscriminately violent tactics ultimately proved a boon for President Kabbah as the 
Freetown government entered the Lomé negotiations and set in motion the country’s 
transitional justice mechanisms.  His credibility endowed him with considerable power 
and flexibility in the months and years following the peace agreement.  As the concluding 
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sections of this chapter demonstrate, this was chiefly evident during the concomitant 
establishment of the Sierra Leonean TRC and Special Court and played a principal role in 
the anemic successes of the former. 
 
Post-Conflict Justice and Accountability: The Special Court for Sierra Leone 
 
Two institutions of transitional justice have their roots in Sierra Leone’s tumultuous post-
war years:  The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) and the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission of Sierra Leone.  Although this paper is primarily concerned with the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission, the fate of the Commission is also directly linked to the 
Special Court and therefore the latter warrants some attention here. 
President Kabbah took full advantage of a surge in political capital following 
Sankoh’s 2000 arrest, flouting the amnesty provisions in the Lomé agreement and 
bringing charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity against Sankoh and other 
senior members of the RUF.  While the amnesty provision of the Lomé Accord prevented 
the Sierra Leonean government from carrying out the prosecutions, the President was 
aware that the UN had only endorsed the agreement on the condition that the amnesty 
provision would not apply to international crimes.158  Thus in a letter addressed to UN 
Secretary General Kofi Annan and the UN Security Council on June 16, 2000, he 
formally requested assistance in establishing “an independent special court”.159   
Annan was enthusiastic about the proposal and pressured the Security Council to 
pass Resolution 1315, granting him permission to begin drafting an agreement with the 
Sierra Leonean government.  In October, 2000 he reported back with a proposal and was 
                                                 
158
 Rashid, Op cit. 
159
 United Nations Security Council. “Letter Dated 9 August 2000 from the permanent representative of Sierra Leone 
to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council.” S/2000/786 
-76- 
 
given approval to proceed defining the specific nature of the Court, “including funding 
options, the particular crimes and their definitions, and the category of persons that would 
be in their jurisdiction”.160  Fifteen months later, on January 16, 2002, the Government of 
Sierra Leone and the UN signed the final agreement establishing the Court.  Unlike the ad 
hoc tribunals of Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the SCSL was designed as a hybrid court, 
giving it both domestic and international jurisdiction.161  The Court headquarters are 
located in Freetown, but it may hold sessions elsewhere as expediency requires (as in the 
trial of Charles Taylor, which is at present being held at The Hague).162  Claiming 
universal jurisdiction, the Court is licensed to prosecute “persons who bear the greatest 
responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean 
law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since November 30, 1996”.163  The 
specific crimes included in this mandate include: war crimes, crimes against humanity, 
and certain crimes under Sierra Leonean law, such as the 1926 Cruelty to Children Act 
and the 1861 Malicious Damage Act.164 
On March 7, 2003, the SCSL indicted Foday Sankoh, Sam Bockarie, and Johny 
Paul Koromah on 17 counts of crimes against humanity as well as violations of Common 
Article 3 and Additional Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions.  Sankoh died in custody 
of natural causes on July 29, 2003 before the case could be completed.  Bockarie was 
killed in Liberia in 2003 prior to being arrested.  Koromah disappeared from Freetown in 
January 2003 and his whereabouts remain unknown.  Nevertheless, the SCSL has 
successful prosecuted several leaders of the kamajor Civil Defense Force.  The cases of 
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RUF commanders Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon, and Augustine Gbao (all of whom 
are in SCSL custody) concluded in February 2009 with each defendant receiving a guilty 
verdict.  Exact sentencing is still pending.165 
 
Post-conflict Justice and Accountability: The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of 
Sierra Leone 
 
The Truth and Reconciliation of Sierra Leone originated in the 1999 Lomé Accords.  
Concerned with the controversial blanket amnesty, representatives from Sierra Leonean 
civil society were dogged in their efforts to formalize some type of “mechanism for 
[victims of the war] to deal with their anguish”.166 Thus they pushed for the insertion of 
relatively modest clause in the final draft of the agreement, articulating the Commission’s 
preliminary framework.   Article 26.1 states: 
A Truth and Reconciliation Commission shall be established to address impunity, break 
the cycle of violence, provide and forum for both the victims and perpetrators of human 
rights violations to tell their story, get a clear picture of their past in order to facilitate 
genuine healing and reconciliation.167  
In February 2000, parliament formalized Article 26 in the Truth and Reconciliation Act, 
articulating the precise objectives of the Commission and establishing the parameters of 
the Commission’s actions in the years to come.   
Acting under advisement from the TRC Working Group, parliament agreed that 
the Commission would be headed by a combination of four Sierra Leonean citizens and 
three representatives of the international community, so as to limit “parochial interests” 
and “bring a fresh perspective”.168  All of the commissioners would be appointed directly 
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by President Kabbah.169  The length of the mandate remained at a somewhat restrictive 
twelve months, but with a clause allowing the President the option of a six-month 
extension for “good cause”.170   
While it sets an operational timeline and establishes clear procedures for the 
appointment of commissioners the TRC Act is often exasperatingly vague when outlining 
the Commission’s mandate.  With thinly veiled frustration, the TRC’s final report 
exclaims: 
The word ‘mandate’ is used three times in the Act, in the context of references to 
‘fulfillment of the commission’s mandate’…but nowhere is there any attempt to explain 
or define what the mandate actually consists of…The Act also contains references to the 
‘functions of the Commission’… [Thus] for the purposes of this discussion there does not 
seem to be any useful or meaningful distinction between ‘mandate’, ‘objects’, and 
‘function’ of the commission.171 
 
This formalized ambiguity made it difficult for the Commission to determine what, 
precisely, it could and could not do and left it vulnerable to a multitude of legal 
challenges; a problem that, as I explain below, would become increasingly evident 
following the creation of the Special Court. 
 The resumption of armed conflict in May 2000 put the Commission’s 
development on hold until March 2002, when President Kabbah approved the 
appointment of the seven commissioners.  In cooperation with the OHCHR, the 
Commission launched a countrywide public awareness campaign, established a research 
agenda and financial management structure, acquired regional offices, and began 
preliminary research on the history of the conflict.  Despite the obstacles presented by the 
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lack of clarity of the TRC Act, the Commission appeared poised for a smooth beginning 
as the date for the commencement of its operations drew closer. 
 This, however, was not entirely the case.  Internally, these preparations were 
blighted by a bitter political battle among the Commission’s staff.  When the 
Commissioners took control in March, they found that the Interim Secretariat charged 
with preparing for their arrival had been woefully inept in drawing up a budget.  “The 
Commissioners were shocked to find that [they] had no funds to operate with”, laments 
the Commission’s final report.172  Although the budget was supposed to have been 
finalized the previous month, considerable donor resistance meant that, in place of the 
expected US $9.6 million, the Commissioners had less than $1.5 million “in cash and 
pledges” to carry out the initial fieldwork.173  Over the next year, the total operating 
budget was whittled down to $4.7 million and the ensuing polarization of the staff over 
the allotment of blame for the mishap, crippled operations for several months. 
 Happily, this internal drama seems to have been limited to the preparatory phase 
of operations.  “The Commission had managed to weather the storm that threatened to 
tear it apart and moved quickly to consolidate its activities, with a view to restoring donor 
and stakeholder confidence in its activities”, the final report asserts.174  External 
challenges, however, would continue to plague the Commission for the extent of its 
mandate. 
 
 
 
 
Truth Commission and Special Court: A Troubled Relationship. 
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Within three months of each other, both the Commission and the Special Court began 
their work with much fanfare.  The simultaneous operation of a war crimes court and a 
truth commission had never been attempted and was expected to deliver a potent one-two 
punch of transitional justice; “a unique opportunity to advance complementary processes 
for accountability”, lauded one article.175   Commenting on the relationship between the 
two institutions, Kofi Annan wrote: “Care must be taken to ensure that the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission will operate in a 
complementary and mutually supportive manner, fully respectful of their distinct, but 
related functions”.176  Unfortunately, this idyllic model of a fruitful partnership never 
manifested itself.  From the very beginning, the Commission was plagued by an implicit 
competition for attention and resources with the court, a problem exacerbated by a legal 
relationship which for all intents and purposes gave the Commission subaltern status.  
The 2002 Special Court Agreement (Ratification) asserts that: “Notwithstanding any 
other law, every natural person, corporation, or other body created by or under Sierra 
Leonean law shall comply with any direction specified in an order of the Special 
Court”.177 
Given this language, the potential for legal complications between the two 
institutions is immense.  The Commission, for example, could collect information on the 
civil war with a guarantee of confidentiality.  But what if this information was 
subpoenaed by the Special Court?  Under the above law, the Commission was 
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theoretically compelled to pass the information on to aid in prosecution.  “Section 21(2) 
does not legislate explicitly for the Commission, but [nonetheless] binds it”, argues the 
International Center for Transitional Justice.178  The TRC, meanwhile, has no legal power 
to access information on the conflict divulged at the Court.  “No formal coordination 
agreements were [ever] concluded between the TRC and the Special Court,” writes 
Elizabeth Evenson.179 
 This conflict of interest was not lost on Sierra Leonean citizens and became a 
major liability for the Commission as it commenced the statement taking portion of its 
mandate.  Citizens across the country, particularly those who participated in the conflict, 
were reluctant to give any testimony for fear that it would eventually be used to bring 
charges against them.  Gibril Massaquoi, an RUF spokesman conjectured that “From our 
understanding it seems as if the Truth and Reconciliation is a court of first 
instance…Confessions of RUF members at the [TRC] are going to be used as evidence in 
the Special Tribunal for the sole purpose of prosecution”.180  A hotel employee in 
Freetown added: “The main problem is a question of motivation.  Suppose I was a victim, 
why should I go to the TRC?  How does it help me?  Maybe I’d rather go to the Special 
Court where penalties may be handed down on the perpetrators.  But even then how can I 
be sure that justice will be delivered?”181  Public incredulity reached almost paranoid 
heights when rumors that the Commission and the Special Court headquarters were 
linked by a secret tunnel spread across Freetown.182 
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Part of the blame for this logjam has been attributed to the failure of the 
Commissioners to effectively convey the distinct objectives of the Commission and the 
Special Court to the public.  Following the Commission’s first six months of operation, 
the NGO, International Crisis Group published a briefing paper alleging that “the TRC 
commissioners are still a largely dysfunctional body that has not yet developed a 
comprehensive operational plan”.183  This was not entirely fair.  Given a vague mandate 
and an immensely challenging work environment, the Commissioners did their best to act 
boldly and test the limits of their power.  In 2004, they filed a formal appeal to the 
Special Court, requesting the testimony of Augustine Gbao in order to gather information 
on RUF activities during the conflict.  The Court flatly denied this appeal, along with 
several others, on the principle that all defendants are innocent until proven guilty.184  In 
a separate appeal, Judge Geoffrey Robertson openly suggested that the Commission 
ought to suspend its operations until the Special Court had completed its prosecutions.185 
The Commissioners hands were tied.  President Kabbah and the Sierra Leonean 
government had turned their attention elsewhere and the Commission did not receive 
adequate support or guidance in coordinating with the Special Court and had little choice 
but to carry out their duties as best they could.  Witness to Truth, the Commission’s final 
report submitted to the government on October 5, 2004, bitterly chastises Kabbah and the 
Special Court, stating: 
The Commission finds it somewhat incongruous that one complementary post-conflict 
body sets itself up as the primary body to achieve the stated aim of the other post-conflict 
body, namely the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. It is also incongruous to assert 
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that the prerequisite for achieving reconciliation is to carry out a function that the other 
complementary body is not empowered to do; namely to prosecute offenders in a court of 
law…The two bodies were not created out of some concerted and coherent plan.  Rather, 
they arose from two different initiatives that were themselves contradictory. The TRC 
grew out of the amnesty in the Lomé Peace Agreement, while the Special Court emerged 
subsequently out of the decision to withdraw the amnesty, at least with respect to a 
limited number of persons The international community has signaled to combatants in 
future wars that peace agreements containing amnesty clauses ought not to be trusted and, 
in doing so, has undermined the legitimacy of such national and regional peace 
initiatives.186 
 
Perhaps vexed by these accusations, President Kabbah’s response to the Commission’s 
final recommendations, delivered in the June 2005 “White Paper”, was lukewarm.  While 
accepting the proposal that the Sierra Leonean government should work to foster a 
culture of human rights in the country, the twelve-page report made no formal or specific 
commitments to implement the vast majority of the Commission’s recommendations.187   
Following the government response, the Commission’s mandate officially ended.   
  
The TRC’s Failures and the Role of Weak State Conditions 
 
Modeling earlier truth commissions, the Sierra Leonean TRC Act describes the 
fundamental aim of the Sierra Leonean commission as being to “create an impartial 
historical record of violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian 
law…; address impunity; respond to the needs of the victims; promote healing and 
reconciliation and to prevent a repetition of the violations and abuses suffered”.  To this 
end, it denotes three primary objectives for the Commission:  1) “to investigate and report 
on the causes of the violations and abuses to the fullest degree possible” 2) “to work to 
help restore the human dignity of victims and promote reconciliation by providing an 
opportunity for victims to give an account of the violations and abuses suffered and for 
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perpetrators to relate their experiences” and 3) “to do all such things as may contribute to 
the fulfillment of the object of the Commission”.188 
While by no means an abject failure, the Sierra Leonean TRC fell well short of 
achieving these goals in three important ways.  First, although it was able to complete its 
statement taking operations, hold some public hearings and produce a detailed and 
gripping final report, the Commission’s findings were compromised by the fact that it 
could not comprehensively outline the antecedents of the conflict or describe the roles of 
many of its major violators.  For example, while the Commission was able to determine 
that the RUF bore the greatest responsibility for the war (60.5% of all violations) they 
were unable to take critical testimony from its ranking members because they either 
refused to participate or were being held for questioning by the Special Court.189  
Investigating the causes of the conflict to the “fullest degree possible” had to be 
completed without perpetrator testimony, compromising the objective of impartiality.     
Second, the Commission’s objective to provide a forum for victims was severely 
curtailed by the fact that few citizens fully understood or were even suspicious of its 
relationship with the Special Court and were therefore hesitant to give testimony. “The 
Commission’s ability to create a forum of exchange between victims and perpetrators 
was unfortunately retarded by the presence of the Special Court,” its final report 
laments.190  60% of Sierra Leoneans polled by the Campaign for Good Governance 
responded that they thought the TRC “would not provide security and confidentiality to 
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its witnesses or were unsure it would do so”.191  Given that a fundamental task of the 
TRC was to foster national reconciliation through honest dialogue, the specter of distrust 
that tainted its activities can hardly be heralded as a success. 
Finally, the Commission’s long-term impact on national reconciliation was 
curtailed when President Kabbah opted to ignore the vast majority of the 
recommendations presented in its final report.  Indeed, Sierra Leonean civil society has 
described the President’s response to the recommendations as “vague and noncommittal” 
and not reflecting “serious engagement on the part of [the] government”.192  As I 
explained in Chapter 1, because mandates for truth commissions rarely extend longer 
than one or two years, the implementation of their final recommendations are crucial to 
their lasting success.  The recommendations of the South African TRC, for instance, led 
to a dramatic shift in the country’s management of its prison system following the 
apartheid regime.  The Sierra Leonean state’s decision to discount this component of the 
TRC’s work jeopardized the most fundamental objectives of its mandate. 
Before moving forward, I offer a brief caveat to this argument.  In this paper, I am 
determining success almost exclusively in the short term.  While I hold that much of a 
truth commission’s success can reasonably be predicted through the language of the 
mandate and initial results in areas such as statement-taking and public relations, I am 
aware that this paper’s ability to determine broader, long-term, success is necessarily 
limited.  The fundamental objective of truth commissions, after all, is to promote lasting 
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peace and reconciliation.  Preliminary successes or failures do not presage the 
achievement of these goals. 
Although a significant portion of blame can be attributed to the Commission’s 
discordant relationship with the Special Court, these anemic results are reflective of 
deeper challenges related to political conditions that appeared as a consequence of the 
civil war.  This section examines the ways in which the weakness of the Sierra Leonean 
following the conflict state adversely impacted the TRC’s ability to effectively pursue its 
mandate.  Specifically, I argue that, adhering to the framework established in Chapter 2 it 
was not the presence of weak state conditions that had the greatest impact on the 
Commission’s success, but President Kabbah's strong hand and tight control over the 
process as well as the state's commitment to the Special Court. These challenges were in 
fact related to the absence of political fragmentation and the enduring legitimacy of the 
Sierra Leonean state.  Knowing this, we can begin to make more general prescriptions 
with respect to the viability of truth commissions in a climate of weak statehood.  These 
questions, however, will be more fully elaborated in Chapter 4.  For the moment, I return 
to the relationship between conditions of weak statehood and the TRC.  
As mentioned above, a major source of anxiety during the early days of the Sierra 
Leonean TRC was its lack of financial support.  For example, by December 2002 the 
government had donated just U.S. $97,000 to the Commission, along with a building to 
house the Secretariat.   Massive corruption and the destruction of economic infrastructure 
that supported resource extraction and other key industries were major contributors to this 
tightfistedness.  Yet while the paucity of government funds in the early post-conflict 
years may have played a part in the Commission’s chronic lack of resources, it does not 
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appear to have been the primary source of the problem.  Rather, most sources indicate 
that the international donor community is to blame.  According to the TRC Statute, the 
Commission’s financial support was to come from a single fund, pooling donations from 
the Sierra Leonean government, but also foreign governments, and NGOs.  Donor fatigue 
following concurrent humanitarian projects in countries such as Kosovo and Afghanistan, 
among others, meant that few were animated to contribute to the TRC.193  Further, the 
early organizational failures of the TRC, particularly during its preparatory phase, meant 
that donors were being asked to contribute without seeing a completed budget—
something that few organizations were prepared to do.194   
Nevertheless, funding difficulties, whether stemming from corruption, poverty, or 
a lack of international support, do not account for the failures described above.  Despite 
having to make considerable revisions to their operating budget, the Commission asserts 
in the final report that it “is satisfied that it was able to carry out important activities such 
as statement taking, public hearings, research and investigations which enabled it to 
deliver a credible final report to the people of Sierra Leone”.195  Moreover, these 
challenges were primarily internal and thus sufficiently insulated from the corruption and 
poverty stemming from the weakness of the Sierra Leonean state following the civil war.   
Looking more closely at infrastructure and public services, the TRC encountered 
several problems in this area, but they did not significantly undercut its mandate.  Public 
education, for instance, was in an abysmal state following the conflict.  The country’s 
80% illiteracy rate and uneven English language competency were serious challenges to 
raising public awareness of the TRC, compromising the Commission’s ability to forge a 
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relationship with the public.196  Further, it final report cites the lack of transportation and 
communication infrastructure outside of Freetown as considerable obstacles to shoring up 
rural participation in the reconciliation process.197  Acquiring four wheel drive vehicles, 
storage space for documents, or even basic recording equipment for statement takers, for 
example, was a constant problem.198 However, although these challenges are generally 
exacerbated in contexts of state weakness, the TRC seems to have overcome them by 
significantly de-centralizing its operations and subcontracting much of its work in rural 
areas to village councils and local civil society partners.199   
In addition to deemphasizing the lack of infrastructure or public services as 
contributing to its shortcomings, the Commission’s effective incorporation of local 
governance and civil society partners also suggests that the erosion of democratic norms 
threatened, but did not ultimately undermine, its success. Many of the features of weak 
states that we are examining are common to most cases where TRCs have been 
established.  For example, while Sierra Leonean citizens were suspicious of the TRC and 
housed a number of misconceptions about its work (that the TRC would pass their 
testimony on to the Special Court is probably the most common example), this appears to 
stem more from difficulties in publically communicating its purpose or adequately 
defining its independence from the Special Court.  Referring to the Commission’s 
‘sensitization campaign’ the final report notes that “overall, the visits [to various 
communities] were not well planned”.200  This, however, is a problem common to both 
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successful and unsuccessful truth commissions throughout history and across the 
spectrum of state strength.  
In a similar vein, it is unlikely that the scale of the human rights abuses committed 
in Sierra Leone played a deciding role in the outcome of the commission.  While perhaps 
more austere and extensive in cases of state weakness, human rights abuses are an 
unfortunate hallmark of all transitional justice mechanisms regardless of their successes.  
In Chapter 2, I warned that that the convoluted networks of responsibility that arise after 
events of mass violence where the central state is not the sole perpetrator may create 
special challenges for truth commissions (for instance, some victims continue to live in 
close proximity to perpetrators and may fear reprisal).  However, the Sierra Leonean 
commission’s final report makes scant mention of this problem and there is nothing to 
indicate that the severity of the country’s human rights abuses represented a significant 
challenge to its success.   
Turning to international peacekeeping forces, although UNAMSIL and the TRC 
worked closely throughout the Commission’s operational period, they failed to develop a 
strong professional rapport.  That being said, there is little evidence to show that this 
ultimately played an important role in derailing the Commission’s work.  The 
peacekeepers could perhaps be faulted for not offering the Commission enough logistical 
support (they did not), but as they had few immediate political interests in the region 
(particularly when contrasted with ECOMOG) and were in fact mandated to facilitate the 
reconciliation process, they never acted to undermine the TRC directly.201  Additionally, 
while there were concerns that the peacekeepers’ relationship with the TRC would prove 
detrimental to its image, this does not seem to have been the case.  The Sierra Leonean 
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public’s distrust of the Commission appears to be only circuitously related to the 
consultative status of the peacekeeping force and was instead largely founded on fears 
that their testimony would be made public or used against them by the Special Court. 
Political fragmentation was not present in the case of Sierra Leone.  In other 
words, power was consolidated in the hands of one or a few powerful state actors.  As we 
have seen, this has been a primary contributor to the difficulties the Commission faced.  
As the literature on fragmentation reviewed briefly in Chapter 2 explains, the greater the 
number of distinct (and possibly armed) political factions, the more challenging 
democratic consolidation becomes.  A higher number of competing interests promotes 
political impasse and requires a substantial amount of compromise.  In such a context, it 
would have made it far more difficult for President Kabbah to press forward with the 
Special Court.  However, while deficient in many ways, the level of consolidation of the 
Sierra Leonean state following the civil war was relatively high. As the RUF was the 
President’s only significant rival following the conflict, political expedience did not 
require him to scale back or moderate his own prosecutorial agenda in favor of the TRC.  
In fact, as I explain in Chapter 4, there is evidence in the Liberian case that political 
fragmentation may have indirectly supported its own commission’s work by diffusing 
opposition to its operation across a broad and disjointed political spectrum. 
Perhaps the principal factor contributing to the failures of the Sierra Leonean TRC 
was the high level of legitimacy possessed by the Sierra Leonean state and President 
Kabbah.  Although the TRC was one of the principal specifications of the Lomé Accords, 
tied closely with the general amnesty provision, Kabbah quickly discovered that his 
strong position allowed him to circumvent the agreement in favor of prosecutions.  
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Indeed, with Sankoh imprisoned and the remainder of the RUF routed, there were few 
serious political obstacles to prosecuting his enemies for war crimes.  Further, the 
President’s international credibility, as demonstrated by his strong support at Lomé, 
allowed him to reach out to the UN for political and logistical support in the endeavor.  
Had Kabbah not been viewed as favorably in Sierra Leonean society, or had his support 
base not been as broad, he could not so easily have shirked the amnesty provisions of the 
peace accord.  This newfound political capital primarily manifested itself in the Special 
Court, virtually ending the Commission’s hope of successfully carrying out its mandate. 
 Curiously, while many of the characteristics of weak states were present in Sierra 
Leone when Kabbah launched his transitional justice agenda, their impact on the Sierra 
Leonean TRC appears to be negligible.  While present, corruption, the lack of public 
services, basic infrastructure, and democratic norms as well the scale of human rights 
abuses during the conflict and the presence of an international intervention force were not 
responsible for the Commission’s operational deficiencies.  These conditions created a 
challenging environment for TRC operations, but they did not significantly hinder its 
fundamental objectives of developing a balanced review of the antecedents of the 
conflict, offering a public space for dialogue and reconciliation, and overseeing the 
realization of its recommendations.  Rather, given these objectives, the legitimacy of the 
Sierra Leonean state and the relatively high level of political consolidation seem to have 
had the greatest influence on the TRC’s outcome.  These conditions, in turn, manifested 
themselves in the form of the Special Court, an institution that placed stringent 
limitations on the Commission’s success by barring the RUF and other high-profile 
perpetrators from providing testimony and contributing to public skepticism of its 
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activities.  Additionally, the power that Kabbah derived from these conditions protected 
him from making formal commitments to the Commission’s recommendations. 
 The implications of these findings are both startling and vexing.  Recalling the 
cases described in Chapter 1, successful truth commissions are generally aided by high 
levels of state legitimacy and political consolidation.  For example, following years of 
military rule in Argentina, President Alfonsín and his commission enjoyed broad popular 
support.  Although the Argentine military (the primary source of opposition) was deeply 
suspicious of CONADEP, breaking from the government and upsetting the consolidation 
of state power was never an option.  In South Africa, the legitimacy of the post-apartheid 
government and its accommodation of institutions and individuals from the old regime 
shielded the TRC from attack and allowed it to wield enormous jurisdictional powers as it 
began investigations and implemented the truth-for-amnesty program. In Sierra Leone, 
however, these conditions had the opposite effect.  Considering that the strengths of the 
Sierra Leonean state led to the attenuation of its truth commission, is it possible that 
greater state weakness could in fact facilitate restorative justice mechanisms such as truth 
commissions?  This is a question that warrants further discussion and I address it in 
greater detail in the following chapter. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Sierra Leonean TRC had few successes.  It was underfunded, poorly managed, and, 
most importantly, undermined from the onset by its theoretical partner in national 
reconciliation, the Special Court.  While it is impossible to accurately speculate on what 
the Commission could have accomplished in the absence of these constraints, we can 
draw several lessons from this case with respect to state failure.  Admittedly, the lack of 
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financial support and poor management were primarily the responsibility of the 
Commission itself; the Sierra Leonean state’s endemic corruption, lack of infrastructure, 
resources, and democratic institutions were all challenges to the TRC’s success, but they 
were not insurmountable.  Rather, it was President Kabbah’s legitimacy in the aftermath 
of the conflict and the consolidation made possible by the absence of formidable 
resistance that allowed him to proceed with the implementation of the Special Court.  
Ironically, it was the strengths of the Sierra Leonean state that brought down the TRC. 
Yet it would be mistaken to say that Sierra Leone’s truth commission was an 
absolute failure.  Indeed, its three-volume report is perhaps the most comprehensive 
record of the brutality of the civil war period in existence.  Because of the Commission’s 
work we know roughly how many people were killed in the conflict.  We know how they 
died and when.  We know whether their deaths came instantaneously, as collateral 
damage in the midst of pitched battle, or were defined by an act of sinister and well-
practiced cruelty, darkly conceived by a single mind and executed with a single pair of 
hands.  As they grow into adulthood, the innumerable children orphaned and abused in 
the conflict can perhaps find some solace in the knowledge of their parents’ final resting 
place and of the fact that they were not alone in their suffering.  Further, as those 
conscripted to fight as child soldiers struggle to make sense of the conflict and their role 
in it, the report will provide some context for their actions.  Older participants will have 
the opportunity to reflect on the events of their baneful past as part of a greater tragedy 
and (hopefully) begin to search for forgiveness. 
But would the Commission’s record have been more complete, its 
recommendations more potent, if expediency had not forced it to perform a balancing act 
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between the search for truth and political calculation?  It is impossible to know for sure.  
Reconciliation is not easily quantified and the many failures of the Sierra Leonean 
Commission may not wholly manifest themselves for years to come.  Whatever the 
outcome, this chapter has made it clear that these failures do not stem from an 
acrimonious and narrowly conceived relationship between two institutions, but reflect 
broader constraints present in Sierra Leone’s transitioning society.  It has demonstrated 
that state legitimacy and the level of political consolidation mattered in the development 
of the Sierra Leonean commission.  In the following chapter I explore this question in 
detail, assess the applicability of these findings in the Liberian case and evaluate their 
broader implications for future truth commissions.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-95- 
 
Chapter 4: Liberia  
I have been looking for an opportunity to tell the true story about my life; and every time I tell 
people my story, I feel relieved…I could be electrocuted, I could be hanged, but I think forgiveness 
and reconciliation is the right way to go. 
                                                                                                             - Milton Blahyi (General ‘Butt Naked’) 
  
Introduction 
 
Reminiscent of the Sierra Leonean case, the Liberian Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission was also created in the aftermath of a brutal civil war.  Thirteen years of 
fighting between Charles Taylor’s NPFL, the Liberian government, and numerous 
warring factions left the country in utter turmoil.  Over 250,000 people were killed and 
perhaps as many as 2.5 million were displaced.  Liberian civilians were regularly 
subjected to ghastly atrocities.  Politically speaking, the Liberian state emerged from the 
conflict in disarray.  The National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL), 
essentially an amalgamation of various rebel groups and members of civil society, was 
confronted with the immense undertaking of rebuilding the country 
Despite the similarities with Sierra Leone, both real and apparent, Liberia’s truth 
commission has encountered considerably more success in carrying out its mandate.  
Returning to the conditions of state weakness, this chapter strives to account for this 
discrepancy.  After providing an account of the Liberian conflict in order to contextualize 
the emergence of weak state conditions, I explain how these conditions influenced the 
creation of the TRC as well as its implementation.  Specifically, I argue that the existence 
of two conditions of state weakness not present in Sierra Leone bear the greatest 
responsibility for the Commission’s relative success: the de-legitimization of the state 
and political fragmentation.  Unlike in Sierra Leone, where the absence of these 
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conditions allowed President Kabbah and other state actors to undermine that country’s 
truth commission, de-legitimization and political fragmentation in the wake of the 
Liberian conflict opened a space virtually free of political constraints where the 
Commission was able to operate more effectively. 
 I address the implications of this argument in greater detail later in the chapter.  
This chapter begins, however, by placing the development of the Liberian TRC in its 
historical context. 
 
The Liberian Tragedy: 1990-2003 
 
The roots of the Liberian civil war can be traced back to the 1980 assassination of 
President William Tolbert.  A variety of factors led to the President’s untimely end and 
the rapid deterioration of “Africa’s oldest republic”.202  For one, the majority of the 
population viewed the President as a hopelessly corrupt leader with a penchant for 
embezzlement and nepotism.  Moreover, Tolbert was a firmly established member of the 
Americo-Liberian elite, and the country’s young, educated, and largely indigenous 
population feared that his presidency was little more than a continuation of Americo-
Liberian oligarchy and would do little to address the needs of the country’s poor and 
middle classes.203  These fears were realized when he attempted to eliminate government 
subsidies for the rice industry, leading to a spike in prices.  The President argued that the 
price increase was meant to stimulate domestic production, reducing imports and 
promoting rapid urbanization.  This assertion was met with skepticism by the indigenous 
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African population which depended heavily on rice as a staple crop and pointed out that 
Tolbert’s family was the single largest rice producer in the country and stood to gain 
handsomely from the price increase.  The President further stoked discontent by invoking 
a 150 year-old law that barred landless Liberians (his most vocal opposition) from 
voting.204  Tensions climaxed the following year in 1980 when the ensuing Rice Riots 
brought the country to a standstill.  In April, frustration with the government finally 
boiled over and President Tolbert was ousted in a military coup led by Master Sergeant 
Samuel Doe, an ethnic Krahn.  Doe killed the former President in his bed after removing 
one of his eyes and, in the following weeks, executed 13 of his ministers.205       
The new regime fared little better than its predecessor.  President Doe was not 
particularly well-liked by the Liberian people.  He had very little leadership experience or 
formal education and was probably illiterate.206  Shortly after the takeover, his newly 
formed People’s Redemption Council (PRC) seized absolute control of the state and 
abolished the Constitution, while doing little to change Tolbert’s hated economic 
policies.207  In what Peter Dennis describes as a “paranoid” effort to keep power, Doe 
began to stack the PRC, previously an institution of mixed ethnicity, with Krahns.208  In 
1981, he killed his vice-president, citing an alleged conspiracy to unseat him and purged 
the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) of its senior leadership.  By 1983, frustration with his 
increasingly irrational and autocratic behavior led three of his closest and most influential 
allies, Thomas Quiwonkpa, Prince Yormie Johnson, and Charles Taylor, to leave the 
PRC.    
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Eventually succumbing to international and domestic pressure, President Doe held 
elections in October, 1985.  He edged out his closest rival, Jackson F. Doe (no relation) 
by a slim margin in a contest widely regarded as fraudulent.  Human rights abuses were 
common in the aftermath of the election as the Doe government attempted to further 
consolidate its hold on the country by violent means.209  The President’s crackdown was 
exacerbated two months later when Quiwonkpa attempted to seize power with a small 
rebel army based in Liberia’s eastern Nimba County.  The takeover failed and 
Quiwonkpa was executed in Monrovia.  Meanwhile, the AFL, mainly ethnic Krahns who 
remained loyal to Doe, pushed Quiwonkpa’s forces back into the countryside, launching 
a bloody campaign in which 3,000 of Nimba County’s ethnic Gios and Manos accused of 
supporting the rebellion were murdered.    
The bitter resentment that this reprisal fostered among Liberia’s rural population 
opened the door for future attempts to topple the Doe government.  “Before Doe, Liberia 
was one of the few African countries without serious tribal hostility,” wrote an American 
journalist.  Four years later, Charles Taylor, who deserted the PRD with Quiwonkpa, saw 
an opportunity to stage his own rebellion.  Taylor, who had been living in Boston and had 
recently escaped from a Massachusetts jail where he was awaiting extradition to Liberia 
on embezzlement charges, returned to Africa in 1986 and began plotting to oust Doe.210  
On December 24, 1989, he and a band of 168 rebels trained and equipped by Libya and 
Burkina Faso crossed the border from neighboring Cote d’Ivoire.211  The National 
Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) initially enjoyed popular support in the Liberian 
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countryside; particularly in Nimba County which was still seething from the AFL’s 
recent incursion.  Riding this support, the NPFL quickly grew to 10,000 troops and 
advanced to the outskirts of Monrovia, slaughtering Krahns and Mandingos, presumed to 
be Doe sympathizers, as they went.212  
The civil conflict worsened during this period and by 1990 the Liberian 
countryside was close to descending into chaos.  In a final effort to maintain order, the 
Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) deployed a 
peacekeeping force of 3,000 troops to Monrovia to facilitate a peace agreement and, at 
least temporarily, hold Taylor’s forces at bay outside the city.213  However, Aboagye and 
Bah assert that “by the time ECOMOG deployed in Liberia, there was virtually no peace 
to keep”.214  At this time, NPFL leadership began to splinter as relations between Charles 
Taylor and Prince Johnson (another PRD deserter) soured.  Johnson and his supporters to 
broke off from the NPFL in July of that year to form the Independent National Patriotic 
Front of Liberia (INPFL).  The two militias constantly attempted to outflank each other 
as they steadily pushed AFL forces back into the heart of Monrovia and became 
embroiled in a deadly race to seize control the capital.215      
The INPFL ultimately won this contest and, in September 1990, they entered the 
city.  While smaller than Taylor’s NPFL, the INPFL enjoyed an informal alliance with 
the ECOMOG peacekeepers who depended on Johnson for supplies and safe-passage 
through the city.216  Under pressure from this combined force, Doe agreed to a ceasefire 
and to work with Johnson to eliminate the NPFL.  Yet this agreement was short-lived.  
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On September 9, 1990, in one of the more gruesome moments of the early war years, Doe 
traveled across Monrovia to meet with the ECOMOG commander Lieutenant-General 
Arnold Quainoo.  The meeting was interrupted by the arrival of Johnson and a contingent 
of INPFL fighters outside of the compound; a firefight quickly broke out between the 
INPFL and Doe’s seventy AFL bodyguards. Doe and his top aides barricaded themselves 
in an office, but were discovered as Johnson’s men stormed the building while ECOMOG 
troops stood by.  The President was then bound and taken to Johnson’s headquarters.  A 
video of the subsequent events shows images of a nearly naked Doe being slowly tortured 
by Johnson, who was becoming progressively more inebriated.  At some point during the 
process, the President died.217   
Simultaneously embarrassed and emboldened by Doe’s murder, the Nigerian-led 
ECOMOG seized the opportunity presented by the subsequent power vacuum to 
strengthen their position in Monrovia, replacing Quainoo, a Ghanaian, with General 
Joshua Dongorayo, a Nigerian.218  They quickly moved forward with the establishment of 
the Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU), led by former dean of Political 
Science at the University of Liberia, Amos Sawyer.219  Simultaneously, they deployed 
reinforcements in the city and forced Johnson, who had by then declared himself 
President, into the city suburbs. 
While Johnson and ECOMOG forces battled to secure Monrovia, Taylor changed 
tactics.  The NPFL leader realized that, although he could not take the capital by force, he 
could make its possession irrelevant.  Over the next several years, the NPFL (now some 
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12,500 strong) expanded their sphere of control across the country.  Thus, the first half of 
the 1990s was characterized by the parallel development of two Liberian governments:  
the internationally recognized IGNU based in Monrovia and the NPFL government 
which, from its stronghold in the town of Gbarnga, controlled the rest of the country—a 
virtual state within a state.  The latter, due to its tight hold over the country’s export 
economy, became increasingly wealthy and powerful, accruing more that U.S. $100 
million annually.220  It was from this position that Taylor began providing financial and 
logistical support to Foday Sankoh and the RUF in Sierra Leone. 
Yet Taylor’s position as de facto leader of the country did not go unchallenged.  
Those who remained of the defeated AFL fled to Sierra Leone where, with the support of 
Liberia’s Mandingo and Krahn populations, they formed the United Liberation 
Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO) and launched incursions into their 
homeland.  In 1994, ULIMO splintered along ethnic lines, forming the Krahn-led 
ULIMO-J and the Mandingo-dominated ULIMO-K, named respectively for their leaders 
Roosevelt Johnson and Alhaji Kromah.221  In 1993 a former minister under Tolbert and 
Doe named George Boley entered the fray with his paradoxically named Liberia Peace 
Council (LPC).  Later that year, these groups were joined by the Lofa Defense Force 
(LDF), a proxy group of the NPFL led by François Massaquoi.  Similar to the RUF, the 
political agenda of these groups was not particularly sophisticated.  Adekeye Adebajo 
explains that: 
Taylor claimed to be waging the war to remove Doe, but opposed the principle of 
democratic elections for years.  Anti-NPFL factions claimed to be fighting for the 
democratic rights of all Liberians, but were essentially ad hoc ethnic armies led by 
individuals with dubious democratic credentials…Underfed and mostly unpaid fighters, 
                                                 
220
 Ellis, Op cit. 
221
 Adebajo, Op cit. 
-102- 
 
many of them drug-induced children, were often only nominally controlled by their 
leaders.222 
       
Fighting in the countryside became the stuff of nightmares.  Warlords adopted 
disquieting and enigmatic noms de guerre such as “General Peanut Butter”, “General 
Butt Naked”, “Cuckoo” and “Bulldog” and led bands of soldiers into battle wearing ball 
gowns, clown wigs, or sometimes nothing at all.223  The period between 1989 and 1996 
was the bloodiest of the war.  Civilians were tortured, raped, and forced into slavery.  
Indeed, in a corner of the world not unfamiliar with violence, the Liberian conflict is 
nonetheless regarded as “peculiarly horrible”.224  In 1991 alone it is estimated that 15,000 
to 20,000 Liberians were killed and another 2 to 2.5 million were displaced.  By 1996 the 
death toll had risen to over 200,000, roughly four percent of the population.225   
Over time the continued fragmentation of the various militias began to destabilize 
Taylor’s power base.  Further, a changing of the guard within ECOMOG made the 
peacekeeping force more amenable to the idea of NPFL rule.226  After over a dozen failed 
negotiations spanning five years, he agreed to form a transitional government and called 
for elections at the Abuja Accords of 1996.  The NPFL became the National Patriotic 
Party with the rather unnerving motto: “He killed my ma.  He killed my pa.  But I’ll still 
vote for him”.227  Taylor, most likely due to Liberians’ desire for some form of stability, 
won handily in the July 1997 elections which international observers deemed free and 
fair.228  “War fatigue,” writes Jeremy Levitt, “rather than Taylor’s popularity was the 
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ultimate determiner at the polls”.229  True to its objective, the following six years saw a 
decrease in fighting as Taylor settled in to his new office. However, this proved to be 
nothing more than a hiatus. 
      Between 1997 and 1999, Liberia became the smuggling hub for the “conflict 
diamonds” that funded the war raging across the northern border in Sierra Leone.  In 
1999 alone Liberia was recorded as having exported 31 million carats of diamonds 
despite the fact that the country had only produced 500,000 carats domestically that 
year.230  Yet despite riches accrued from the smuggling trade, the Liberian people saw 
few improvements in their quality of life.  Further, as the decade progressed, Taylor 
became increasingly autocratic.  Flaunting prior agreements with ECOMOG, he 
reconstituted and expanded the military.  He dismissed political dissenters within the new 
government and simply killed those outside of it.  Security in the countryside deteriorated 
and popular discontent grew.231  By April 1999, yet another rebel army appeared on the 
scene.  Based across the border in Guinea and likely bankrolled by the Guinean armed 
forces, Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) swept across the 
country and, in 2002, was poised to take Monrovia.232   
However, in what had become something of a tradition in the country, LURD was 
soon joined by an additional rebel force known as the Movement for Democracy in 
Liberia (MODEL).  Many of the worst human rights abuses of the war occurred in the 
ensuing bedlam.  LURD, for instance, would regularly attack IDP camps in order to 
‘recruit’ child soldiers.  Entire towns were plundered to support the war effort.  Caught 
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between LURD and MODEL, which were supported by a steady flow of arms from 
Guinea and Cote d’Ivoire, Taylor was eventually forced to accept an ECOWAS-brokered 
peace accord in Accra, Ghana in June 2003.233  
 
The Accra Accords 
 
Interestingly, the 2003 Accra Accords owe a great deal of their success to the Special 
Court of Sierra Leone.  In the days leading up to the peace talks, many of the participants, 
which included representatives of LURD, MODEL, and the Government of Liberia 
(GOL), as well as representatives from civil society and registered political parties, were 
apprehensive that no real peace could be achieved as long as Taylor was involved.  Then, 
on the first morning of talks, Taylor was indicted by the Special Court for his role in the 
Sierra Leonean conflict, drastically weakening his position as the legitimate leader of 
Liberia. He left the conference almost immediately after unsealing the indictment and on 
August 11, 2003 fled to exile in Nigeria. “Taylor’s departure immediately changed the 
chemistry, the actual facts, and the guiding presumptions of the negotiations,” writes 
Priscilla Hayner.234  The power dynamics of the Accords were dramatically altered as the 
GOL lost credibility.  Over the following two weeks the parties continued the talks 
without Taylor, agreeing on June 17 to a ceasefire that included a clause barring the 
former president from any participation in the new government.235   
The following weeks of negotiations were an intense and violent period.  Rebel 
leaders maintained steady contact with their field commanders via cell phone and quickly 
discovered that they could impress their agendas on other parties by ordering renewed 
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shelling on Monrovia.  Violent images of the attacks would appear almost 
instantaneously on CNN and civil society representatives received phone calls describing 
the carnage on the ground, leading the rebels’ opponents to cede important negotiating 
points.  “One or more rockets would be sent into Monrovia, and people in Monrovia 
would be telling us ‘you have to give them anything they want to get it to stop,’” noted 
one civil society representative.236  Civil society groups also applied considerable 
pressure to the various delegations.  As many as two hundred protestors would stand 
outside the meeting hall each day and one women’s group memorably sealed the 
delegates in, refusing to let them leave until they had reached an agreement.237 
A major component of the negotiation was the appointment of a head of state for 
the two-year transitional period leading up to the 2005 elections.  The delegations 
representing civil society and the political parties drew up a short list that included Ellen 
Johnson-Sirleaf, Rudolph Sherman, and Gyude Bryant which would then be submitted 
for final approval by MODEL, LURD and the GOL.238  Johnson-Sirleaf, who would win 
the presidential election two years later, was the most popular candidate, but she was 
ultimately rejected by the warring parties for fear that she might “hold the war’s 
perpetrators to account”.239  Gyude Bryant became Chair of the interim government. 
The final phase of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) concerning the 
exact nature and structure of the transitional government (the National Transitional 
Government of Liberia, or NTGL), was drafted and signed hastily.   Shelling in Monrovia 
had intensified throughout the months of July and August, compelling the delegates to 
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include final components into the agreement without much (if any) negotiation.  The 
completed document allocated a large number of seats in the National Transitional 
Legislative Authority (NTLA0—the NTGL’s legislative arm—to MODEL, LURD, and 
the GOL.  Further, it gave the warring parties nearly all of the ministerial position and 
contained few provisions for oversight or vetting.240  Nevertheless, all parties signed the 
agreement on August 18, 2003. 
The above narrative is designed to highlight the ways in which the political 
conditions elaborated in Chapter 2 emerged during the Liberian civil war and Accra 
Accords.  Similar to Sierra Leone, corruption, the deterioration of infrastructure and 
public services, widespread human rights abuses, and the presence of an international 
intervention force represented significant challenges to a peaceful, democratic 
consolidation in Liberia in the immediate post-conflict period.  Additionally, the Liberian 
case was characterized low levels of state legitimacy and high levels of political 
fragmentation, two conditions that were not present in Sierra Leone at the time that 
country began its reconciliation process.  The following section addresses these 
conditions in more detail, recalling from the previous chapter how they may have 
influenced the development of Liberia’s truth commission. 
 
The Aftermath of Conflict and Emergent Aspects of State Weakness: Liberia 
 
The Liberian civil war mirrors the Sierra Leonean case in many important ways.   
Fourteen years of conflict have left the country on the brink of failure, fostering the 
emergence of many of the political conditions laid out in Chapter 2.  Human rights abuses 
were propagated on an unimaginable scale.  Over 250,000 people were killed in the 
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fighting.241  Cases of torture, the recruitment of child soldiers, and sexual violence were a 
common occurrence throughout the war.  The continual breakdown and loose discipline 
of the numerous rebel groups heightened the acuteness of the abuses by scattering the 
fighting across the country.  There was no central theater to this conflict as battles raged 
from county to county and town to town. 
 As in Sierra Leone, endemic corruption and a breakdown of infrastructure have 
emerged as fundamental challenges in the wake of the conflict.242  Transparency 
International, a watchdog group, has cited an entrenched culture of “petty corruption” 
that, coupled with a woefully underequipped judicial system, “cannot support an anti-
corruption regimen”.243  U.S. law firm Dorsey & Whitney adds that “corruption is a 
problem in all levels of government”.244  These institutionalized inefficiencies have 
contributed to an overall deterioration of infrastructure and public services.  Electricity is 
only sporadically available outside of downtown Monrovia.  In 1997, 58% of households 
had access to clean drinking water while by 2005 that number had dropped to 27%.245  
Orchestrating any type of national reconciliation effort becomes all the more challenging 
where transportation and communications infrastructure are absent and trust in 
government institutions is low.  
 The erosion of democratic norms following the civil war was a grave problem in 
post-conflict Liberia and, as I explain below, has remained a challenge throughout the 
Liberian TRC’s operational mandate.  In the wake of the conflict, the NTGL Results 
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Focused Transitional Framework highlighted the need for dramatic reform in “key public 
sector establishments, the public service, and the main economic governance 
institutions”.246  “Against the background of weak institutional apparatus and the vagaries 
of factional transitional government,” it continues, “continuous engagement represents 
the strongest [method] to hold the transition process to acceptable standards of 
performance”.247  “The brutality with which political opposition of any kind has been 
dealt in recent decades has made most citizens fearful of participating in the political 
process,” adds the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs.248  Rebuilding 
networks of trust between state and citizen will remain a crucial project in the coming 
years. 
 The presence of 15,000 UNMIL peacekeepers remains a haunting reminder of 
past violence and a visible testament to Liberia’s continued reliance on an external 
military force to provide security.  As was so repugnantly evident during the final days of 
Samuel Doe’s presidency, peacekeepers are capable of becoming mired in national 
conflicts and pressing their own political agendas and acting out their ambitions on the 
local population.249  Indeed, ECOMOG’s regional ambitions were played out in equal 
measure in Liberia and Sierra Leone.250  While the UNMIL force is more tightly 
constrained than ECOMOG, the specific responsibilities of the force continue to be a 
controversial issue and will be of central importance as the Liberian state works toward a 
more robust consolidation.251 
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 Despite the similarities between Liberia and Sierra Leone in the aftermath of their 
civil wars, the countries diverge in two important respects.  First, the NTGL did not enjoy 
the same amount of legitimacy as President Kabbah’s government upon taking power.  
After Taylor was forced to resign and flee to Nigeria there was no nationally recognized 
leader to take his place.  Gyude Bryant, an Episcopalian minister and businessman, was 
eventually selected by the warring parties as NTGL Chair because he was widely viewed 
to be politically neutral.252  However, this neutrality and his selection as a “compromise 
candidate” proved to be his greatest liability, as few Liberians had any idea who their 
new leader was and were reluctant to rally behind him.253   
The selection process for the NTLA also threatened to undermine the new 
government’s credibility.   Although the CPA stipulated that LURD and MODEL, the 
primary rebel factions in the country, would be dissolved once the agreement was signed, 
the agreement explicitly states that there would be “no restrictions” on these groups 
entering the government as political parties.254  The final composition of the NTLA 
included: 12 LURD representatives, 12 representatives from the GOL, 12 MODEL 
representatives, 18 representatives from the political parties, 7 representatives from civil 
society and ‘special interest groups’, and 15 representatives from the country’s 
counties.255  Unlike President Kabbah, whose support carried over from his 1996 
elections, the Center for Democratic Empowerment writes that  “none of the current 
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members of the NTLA obtained their position by means of a democratic election…they 
do not have any popular mandate to serve”.256   
Additionally, the composition of the NTLA reflects a pervasive characteristic of 
the Liberian conflict that never manifested itself in Sierra Leone: political fragmentation.  
As elaborated in the previous section, rebel groups in the Liberian conflict were involved 
in a near constant process of breakdown and reformation.  Differing from the RUF, 
Liberian rebels rarely fought under a single banner. This was certainly the case with 
MODEL and LURD, who were little more than nominal representatives of a far more 
nebulous constituency whose interests did not always align.257  Once established, the 
NTLA therefore acted centrifugally and each member worked to secure their own 
interests.  As the next section demonstrates, the de-legitimization of the Liberian 
government and its continued fragmentation are of crucial importance in understanding 
the eventual development of the Liberian TRC. 
 
The Creation of the Liberian TRC         
 
The sheer scope of the violence that enveloped Liberia over the previous 14 years 
brought national reconciliation to the center of the 2003 Accra Accords; the precise form 
this reconciliation would take, however, became a hotly debated issue.  The majority of 
civil society groups, such as the Women of Liberia Mass Action for Peace, as well as the 
political parties that participated in the talks emphasized retributive justice and strongly 
advocated for the creation of a war crimes tribunal of a similar model to the SCSL.  
MODEL, LURD, and other warring parties meanwhile pushed hard for a truth 
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commission because it improved their chances of receiving amnesty.258 Aaron Sleh writes 
that “justice, in the traditional legal sense, had to become a currency for purchasing 
peace”.259       
Ultimately, the truth commission lobby prevailed largely because of their superior 
military strength.  However, while the rebel factions at Accra succeeded in obtaining the 
truth commission, the final agreement did not include a blanket amnesty provision as the 
RUF had at Lomé.  Hayner argues that a primary reason for this was the fact that most 
parties assumed that, given the shoddy condition of Liberia’s domestic courts, a TRC 
would amount to the same thing.  “The TRC was very attractive,” a representative of civil 
society noted, “You didn’t need a general amnesty, because the TRC would give you an 
amnesty, it was thought.  There was a sense that it was clear: a tribunal means you’d be 
put away, but the TRC wouldn’t put you in jail”.260  Indeed, no one at the Accords 
seemed to be paying attention and “a level of comfort developed such that no one feared 
prosecution and many assumed somehow that an amnesty was included within the 
text”.261  The combative nature of the agreements (major hostilities continued in 
throughout the summer of 2003), coupled with the fact that no single group would have 
enough power to prosecute its rivals seems to have fed this complacency. Indeed, the 
final draft of the agreement gave 12 seats on the National Transitional Legislative 
Assembly to both LURD and MODEL, making it unlikely that either party could 
eliminate its rivals through a prosecutorial campaign.  “The idea of a TRC became more 
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attractive than a war crimes tribunal,” writes Thomas Jaye, “the nature of the outcome of 
the war did not favor the latter”.262 
Thus, Article 8 of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement proclaims that:  
A Truth and Reconciliation Commission shall be established to provide a forum that will 
address issues of impunity, as well as an opportunity for both the victims and the 
perpetrators of human rights violations to share their experiences, in order to get a clear 
picture of the past to facilitate genuine healing and recreation.263 
        
As in Sierra Leone, the road from a clause embedded in a peace accord to an actual truth 
commission was long.  The CPA’s language regarding the truth commission was vague, 
leaving many decisions about its structure and membership to the NTLA and, more 
importantly, to the Commission itself.264  This lack of guidance nearly derailed the entire 
process at its inception when the Transitional Chairman announced the appointment of 
the TRC commissioners in early 2004 without the consent or participation of the NTLA 
and prior to any form of legislative agreement on what the TRC’s mandate would be.   
 As Liberia continued to move toward relative stability, however, the national 
legislature’s attitude toward the TRC became one of wholehearted acceptance and in the 
following weeks and months, Liberian civil society both within and outside the NTLA, 
along with a slew of international supporters began to rectify the situation.  Working 
closely with the Center for Democratic Empowerment, they began to draft the 2005 TRC 
Bill, including a number of progressive provisions and strong language designed to aid 
the TRC in acting with the most efficacy possible.265  Indeed, the TRC Bill, in addition to 
adding much needed structure to the Commission established one of the most progressive 
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mandates ever laid out for a truth commission.  The powers granted to the new TRC are 
sweeping.  Article 6, section 21 of the Mandate states:  
The TRC shall enjoy full independence in pursuit of the scope of its mandate and the 
exercise of its duties…its work shall be regarded as a matter of national priority; all 
matters of the TRC appearing before the Supreme Court of Liberia shall be 
advanced…without the slightest delay as a matter of first priority. 
 
Section 21 continues:  “The full authority and capacity, and the resources of the 
Government of Liberia shall and is hereby placed at the disposal of the TRC…”266 
Regarding the question of amnesty, Article 7, Section 26 of the mandate leaves 
the final say to the Commission, granting it the power to make recommendations with 
regard to “legal, institutional, and other reforms and the need to hold prosecutions in 
particular cases as the TRC deems appropriate”.267   In cases of crimes against humanity 
or violations of international humanitarian law, the TRC is explicitly forbidden from 
offering amnesty.268  That said, at the time of writing the TRC has not yet adopted a 
prosecutorial framework that explicitly spells out who is and is not exempt from 
receiving amnesty.269 
 In an unprecedented move, the NTLA mandated that the Commission’s 
recommendations will be legally binding.  Article 10, Section 48 of the Mandate asserts:   
The Head of State shall report to the National Legislature within three months of receipt 
of the report of the TRC, and on a quarterly basis thereafter, as to the implementation of 
the Commission’s recommendations. All recommendations shall be implemented. When 
the implementation of the any recommendation has not been complied with, the 
legislature shall require the Head of State to show cause for such non-compliance. [my 
emphasis].270 
 
                                                 
266
 National Transitional Legislative Assembly. “An Act to Establish the Truth and Reconciliation of Liberia”. 12 
May, 2005 Article 6.21 
267
 Ibid. Article 7.26 
268
 Sleh, Op cit. 
269
 Amnesty International. “Liberia: Towards the Final Phase of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission”. Jul. 2008 
270
 National Transitional Legislative Assembly, Op cit. 10.48 
-114- 
 
This provision essentially gives the TRC the final word on who will receive amnesty and 
who will be prosecuted.   
Additionally, the Commission is the first in history to take statements from the 
diaspora communities of Liberian refugees who fled to Ghana, the United States, and the 
United Kingdom.  The two-year operational period of the Liberian TRC began in June 
2006.  Public hearings began in January 2008.  The Commission has requested and been 
approved to extend its mandate for an additional twelve months, allowing it time to take 
testimony from President Johnson-Sirleaf and complete the compilation of its final report.  
 
The Role of Weak State Conditions in the Initial Success of the Liberian TRC 
 
In Chapter 3 I asserted that the relative legitimacy of the Sierra Leonean state and the 
absence of political fragmentation in the immediate aftermath of the civil war were the 
primary inhibitors of its truth commission’s success.  Although most of the weak state 
conditions described in Chapter 2 were present in Sierra Leone and did hinder the TRC’s 
operations, they did not significantly influence its success in achieving the objectives 
outlined in its mandate.  Broadly speaking, these findings appear to suggest that in a 
weak state context state legitimacy and political fragmentation matter in determining 
truth commission success. In this section I intend to put this suggestion to the test.   
Through a review of its civil conflict, I have shown that Liberia exhibits the same 
political conditions that emerged in Sierra Leone during and after its own civil war, with 
the additional conditions of state de-legitimization and political fragmentation.  The 
question, then, is did these conditions produce different results in the Liberian case?  Did 
the presence of these additional conditions of state weakness have an impact on the 
Liberian TRC’s success?  In this section, I argue that the Liberian state’s weakness, 
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demonstrated by the presence of the above conditions, created a political space in which 
the Commission was able to operate with fewer constraints, paving the way for greater 
success. 
As in Chapter 3, I evaluate success based on each commission’s ability to 
achieve the objectives laid out in their respective mandates. Before launching into an 
assessment of the Liberian TRC’s success, I should offer a brief caveat: because the 
Liberian TRC is still in operation, it is not possible to as completely evaluate successes 
and failures.  Unlike in the Sierra Leonean case, there is no final report that outlines 
the Liberian commission’s operational challenges and weak points.  Nevertheless, by 
examining its mandate as well as the information it has released in quarterly and semi-
annual progress reports, we can begin to establish some guidelines for measuring its 
achievements.   
Closely mirroring the Sierra Leonean TRC Act, The TRC Act of Liberia defines 
Commission’s primary objectives as:  
a) Investigating gross human rights violations and violations of international 
humanitarian law as well as abuses that occurred… determining whether these were 
isolated incidents or part of a systematic pattern; establishing the antecedents, 
circumstances factors and context of such violations and abuses; and determining 
those responsible for the commission of the violations and abuses and their motives 
as well as their impact on victims. 
b) Providing a forum that will address issues of impunity, as well as an opportunity for 
both victims and perpetrators of human rights violations to share their experiences in 
order to create a clear picture of the past so as to facilitate genuine healing and 
reconciliation. 
In addition, the Commission is tasked with compiling a “comprehensive” and “critical 
review of Liberia’s historical past in order to address falsehoods and misconceptions 
about the nation’s past socioeconomic and political development”.   
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When compared to Sierra Leone’s truth commission, the Liberian TRC has come 
far closer to achieving these goals.  Overcoming considerable obstacles, including a lack 
of funds, poor infrastructure, and a low level of trust among much of the Liberian public, 
it has succeeded in taking approximately 24,000 statements from victims and perpetrators 
across the country in addition to hundreds more from diaspora communities.271  During 
its mandate, the Sierra Leonean Commission collected only 7,706.272  Moreover, the 
Liberian TRC took testimony from several high-profile figures, including: President 
Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, former INPFL leader Prince Johnson, former AFL Chief of Staff 
Henry Dubar, former LPC leader George Boley, Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister 
Commany Wisseh, Milton Blahyi (also known as General ‘Butt Naked’), and former U.S. 
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Herman Cohen, who apologized for 
American failures to stop the conflict.273  As Chapter 3 explained, similar high-profile 
testimony was not possible in Sierra Leone. 
 Yet in addition to these relative accomplishments, the Liberian Commission’s 
mandate also endows it with powers and responsibilities that extend well beyond those 
of the Sierra Leonean TRC and in fact are reminiscent of truth commissions in much 
strong states such as South Africa.  For instance, it is the first commission in history 
whose recommendations are legally binding and, due to the absence of a general 
amnesty, it reserves the right to recommend prosecutions on an individual basis.274  
These variances beg two questions.  First, given all of the contextual similarities 
underpinning these two cases, how, then, did the Liberian context differ from Sierra 
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Leone in ways that ultimately mattered in shaping the success of its truth commission?  
Second, what aspects of the Liberian political climate following the civil war allowed 
for its mandate to extend beyond that of the Sierra Leonean commission in scope and 
power?  Addressing the first question, we must briefly review the ways in which 
conditions of state weakness affected the Commission’s work. 
In the immediate aftermath of the Liberian civil war, corruption and the absence 
of substantial transportation and communications infrastructure created significant 
challenges for the Liberian TRC.  Throughout the Commission’s operation period, 
financial support from the Liberian government has been steady but slight.  International 
donors, meanwhile, were reluctant to give to the TRC amidst growing concerns over 
corruption and the size of its budget.275  In early 2007, for example, the Commission was 
nearly shut down due to a lack of funds.276  After significant restructuring, it was able to 
resume its operations, albeit on a slightly less robust scale. 
The sorry state of Liberia’s infrastructure was an additional problem.  Hayner 
asserts that “limitations of infrastructure, human resources and funding, and other basic 
structural and organizational demands, have compounded what was already an enormous 
task of investigations, statement-taking and public hearings”.277  Similar to Sierra Leone, 
the Commission has responded to this hindrance by engaging a number of civil society 
partners and de-centralizing its operations across the country’s 13 counties, thus 
minimizing the necessity for transportation between sites and allowing the various 
departments to work semi-independently.  For example, the Advocates for Human 
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Rights, a U.S. based NGO was charged with developing community outreach activities 
and managing statement taking in the U.S., the United Kingdom, and Ghana.278  
Nevertheless, a lack of financial support and infrastructural deficiencies remained 
obstacles throughout the process. This problem was shared by both the Sierra Leonean 
and Liberian cases, however, and its ability to explain the variation between their truth 
commissions is negligible. 
Likewise, the failure of democratic norms and flagrant human rights abuses were 
equally encumbering conditions in both the Liberian and Sierra Leonean cases.  As the 
TRC was a product of the unelected and warlord-run NTGL, winning the trust of the 
Liberian public was a daunting task.  Perhaps recalling how similar troubles for the Sierra 
Leonean commission were exacerbated by the Special Court, one advertisement for the 
Commission read “TRC public hearings: Not a court house”.279  Additionally, memories 
of the horrific violence of the war years remained omnipresent for most Liberians and as 
the TRC began its investigation and statement-taking operations it was forced to go to 
great lengths to convince the public that it was safe to provide testimony.  Women were 
particularly vulnerable during this period and the TRC is often cited as not having done 
enough to protect them from retaliation.280  Strengthening democratic institutions and 
reducing the stigma created by massive human rights abuses during the war will continue 
to be a sluggish process in Liberia.  However, this is a characteristic common to many 
post-conflict societies, including Sierra Leone.  It is unlikely that these conditions 
underscore a significant divergence between the two cases. 
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 International peacekeeping forces do not appear to have had a major impact on 
the success of the Liberian TRC.  As in Sierra Leone, ECOMOG forces were viewed by 
most Liberians as politically motivated and untrustworthy.  To a large extent, however, 
this stigma has not carried over to UNMIL forces.  Conversely, the considerable 
logistical support and counseling they have provided the Commission has greatly 
enhanced its investigative capabilities, particularly in the area of gender violence.  In this 
respect, the Liberian case varies little from Sierra Leone. 
Whereas the political conditions cited above were shared by both the Liberian and 
Sierra Leonean cases, the Liberian state has also been plagued by low levels of 
legitimacy and high levels of political fragmentation.  Indeed, political fragmentation 
played a large part in the success of the Liberia’s truth commission.  The marked ethnic 
dimension of Liberia’s civil war (not present in Sierra Leone) along with a general lack 
of cohesion among armed groups greatly facilitated the fragmentation of the conflict.  
Fragmentation, in turn, did two things to heighten the Liberian TRC’s success.  First, it 
prevented any of the parties at Accra from considering the implications of there being no 
general amnesty provision in the final agreement.  With Taylor essentially removed from 
play following his war crimes indictment, the GOL and its military backers were greatly 
weakened.  Control of the country was up for grabs and the pitched battle that ensued 
meant that no party was in a position to force an agenda.   
Similarly, the segmented character of the Liberian government following the 
Accra Accords prevented any serious challenges to the Commission’s work from 
materializing.  For instance, shortly after the TRC began its public statement-taking phase 
a number of Charles Taylor supporters united under the banner of the Association for the 
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Legal Defense of Charles G. Taylor moved to block all testimony against the former 
president.  The Liberian Supreme Court struck down this motion, vividly illustrating, 
although Taylor had at one time enjoyed considerable popular backing, the fractious 
nature of post-war politics in Liberia prevented his supporters from overriding the 
reconciliation process.281  This stands in stark contrast with the Sierra Leonean case, 
where President Kabbah was able to unilaterally move forward with prosecutions as there 
was no opposition group strong enough to stop him. 
Second, fragmentation opened a political space that allowed the architects of the 
Liberian TRC to insert a number of progressive and powerful provisions into its mandate.  
Following the Accra Accords, fragmentation was institutionalized in the NTGL as each 
warring party as well as civil society representatives received roughly the same number 
of seats in the NTLA.   Power within the legislative body was thus diffused to such an 
extent that, when the TRC subcommittee began cooperating with international NGOs to 
draft the more progressive clauses of the TRC Act, no single faction had the power to 
upset the process.  In contrast with the Sierra Leonean TRC, the result has been a truth 
commission that holds exclusive control over amnesty and prosecution for perpetrators 
and legally binding authority over the Liberian parliament. 
In addition to political fragmentation, the lack of legitimacy possessed by the 
Liberian government in the early years after Accra shielded the commission from 
disruption by a powerful head of state.  Compared to Kabbah and the Freetown 
government in post-conflict Sierra Leone, the NTGL did not possess remotely the same 
level of legitimacy in the eyes of the public.  For one, the NTGL was not democratically 
elected, whereas President Kabbah was able to ride his support from the 1996 elections to 
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undertake an ambitious agenda of government reforms and reconciliation efforts.  The 
immediate post-war period in Liberia, led by the NTLA and Chairman Bryant, 
meanwhile, was plagued by impotence and self-interest.  Indeed, reflecting their 
compromised position, rather than attempt to draw up any ambitious plans for reform the 
NTLA became immersed in the trivialities of government.  Ezekiel Pajibo, Director of 
the Center for Democratic Empowerment, explains that:  
Most legislative debates [between 2003 and 2004] centered around pecuniary benefits to 
legislative members including the purchases of luxury vehicles, the vaunted “resettlement 
package” – a financial package to assist members of the Assembly to comfortably 
“resettle” themselves in Monrovia and the refurbishment of homes and offices of leaders 
of the Assembly…the public felt that given the special circumstances within the country, 
it was not helpful for members of the legislature to be more concerned about their 
individual comfort while the overwhelming majority of Liberians were living in destitute 
conditions.282 
 
The circumstances surrounding the NTGL’s creation prevented them from acting boldly 
or swiftly.  It was widely joked that the acronym stood for “Nothing to Give Liberia”.283  
President Kabbah and the Freetown government, free from transitional entrenchment, 
were capable of pursuing the Special Court which, as I explained in Chapter 3, derailed 
the TRC.  The lack of legitimacy of state actors in Liberia inadvertently translated into 
political capital for the truth commission and thus made similar action in that country 
impossible. 
 Political fragmentation and the de-legitimization of the state were the primary 
factors in determining the success of the Liberian TRC.  The absence of these conditions 
in Sierra Leone was essential in precipitating its truth commission’s failures.  Recalling 
the Sierra Leonean case, we found that the greater legitimacy of the Sierra Leonean state, 
coupled with the lack of powerful or well-defined opposition groups undermined its truth 
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commission’s efforts toward restorative justice.  Conversely, in Liberia the absence of 
state legitimacy and multitude of weak opposition groups has actually aided restorative 
justice.  These findings suggest that in contexts of extreme state weakness traditional 
assumptions about what political conditions are favorable for truth commissions, no 
longer hold.  That is, the weaker the state in certain respects, the greater the potential for 
the truth commission to successfully carry out its mandate. 
 Through the cases of Liberia and Sierra Leone, this paper has offered preliminary 
evidence for such a phenomenon.  Why this seems to occur is a subject for future study.  
However, it appears that when certain conditions of state weakness are carried to their 
extreme, as was the case in Liberia, they carve new political spaces where restorative 
justice mechanisms such as truth commissions can flourish.  As I explained in Chapter 1, 
the most successful truth commissions historically have been those that were able to 
negotiate the political constraints specific to their particular context.  In Chapter 2, I 
postulated that extremely weak states may present a number of political conditions that 
previous truth commissions never had to face: de-legitimization of the state; corruption 
and the deterioration of public services; the failure of democratic norms, widespread 
human rights abuses; political fragmentation; and the presence of an international 
intervention force.  Surprisingly, these findings indicate is that when two of these 
conditions, de-legitimization and political fragmentation, are present in weak states, they 
actually liberate the truth commission from political constraints.   
Put another way, on a fundamental level these findings deal with power.  De-
legitimization and political fragmentation are epi-phenomena that reflect the ways that 
power in post-conflict Liberia and Sierra Leone was channeled, diffused, consolidated, or 
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equalized.  They are conditions that can either enhance or limit the power of state actors.   
As we have seen, the case of Sierra Leone represents the former, where power was 
consolidate into the hands of a few legitimate state actors, and Liberia the latter, where 
power was diffused across a much broader array of actors.  Although additional 
conditions of state weakness can create problems related to funding, poor infrastructure 
and public skepticism, this study has shown that they are not insurmountable challenges. 
Of course, none of this is meant to give the impression that we should forgo 
political consolidation in favor of restorative justice; de-legitimization and fragmentation 
are not the goal.  However, in terms of transitional justice policy, these findings can offer 
guidance as to how reconciliation efforts should take shape in order to yield the best 
results.  By appraising, or possibly even shaping, the fundamental currents of power in 
states that exhibit signs of extreme weakness, policymakers and state actors may be able 
to amend the political climate in order to make it more favorable to one form of justice or 
another.  For instance, in cases where the state exhibits a number of conditions of 
weakness, but is largely perceived as legitimate and has few strong competitors, the 
interests of state actors will govern what is possible.  On the other hand, states that are by 
and large not viewed as legitimate actors and are characterized by pervasive factionalism 
may present greater opportunities for truth commissions because disparate groups will 
need to negotiate and makes concessions to maintain their grip on power.  
 
Conclusion 
The wounds of Liberia’s tragic civil war will likely take generations to fully heal.  
Ultimately, reconciliation must occur in the minds of victims and perpetrators; 
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mechanisms of transitional justice, retributive or restorative in nature, only act as 
mediums in this process.  Nevertheless, mechanisms and truth commissions and 
particular do not serve simply as tools for individual reconciliation, but also national 
reconciliation and therefore their successes and failures matter greatly.   
In this chapter I have explored the emergence of political conditions characteristic 
of weak states in Liberia in comparison to Sierra Leone in order to evaluate which of 
these conditions had the greatest impact on the Liberian TRC’s success.  Despite 
exhibiting many of the same conditions as Sierra Leone, including high levels of 
corruption, a deterioration of infrastructure and public services, widespread human rights 
abuses and the presence of an international intervention force, Liberia displays two 
additional characteristics: de-legitimization and political fragmentation.  These 
conditions, I argue, played the single greatest role in determining the Liberian TRC’s 
success by opening up a political space absent of the constraints where the Commission 
could operate more freely.  That is to say, de-legitimization and political fragmentation 
reflect the fundamental currents of power in each case which play an enormous role in 
determining the success of truth commissions as well as other transitional justice 
mechanisms.  While it is difficult to assess the numerous potential ramifications of these 
findings, they have the potential to offer guidance for future states emerging from conflict 
and the transitional justice community as they strive to achieve lasting peace and national 
reconciliation. 
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Conclusion 
 
This is how one pictures the angel of history. His face is turned toward the past. Where we perceive 
a chain of events, he sees one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and 
hurls it in front of his feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what has 
been smashed. But a storm is blowing in from Paradise...this storm irresistibly propels him into the 
future to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris before him grows skyward. This storm is 
what we call progress. 
                                                                                                      - Walter Benjamin 
 
 
This has been a story of two truth commissions that, while established in states regularly 
characterized as weak or ‘failed’, diverged considerably in their efforts to promote 
restorative justice.  The fundamental goal of these commissions, as with all truth 
commissions, is through exhaustive research and statement-taking from both victims and 
perpetrators to establish a universal record of past events that simultaneously offers the 
public solace by placing their personal tragedies into a greater context and acts as a 
platform for governmental reforms designed to promote national reconciliation.  As the 
last two chapters have shown, Sierra Leone and Liberia were not equally successful in 
this endeavor. 
Why, then, despite similar national origins, political histories and patterns of 
conflict, did Liberia and Sierra Leone diverge so dramatically in implementing effective 
mechanisms of restorative justice?  Superficially, the answer seems to be the existence of 
the Special Court.  Proving too strong a competitor for resources and international 
attention, as well as taking advantage of an undefined, but inherently unequal legal 
relationship with the Sierra Leonean TRC, the Special Court ran roughshod over the 
Commission’s agenda and substantially weakened its ability to seek out the roots causes 
of conflict and promote national reconciliation.  But the SCSL is not the root of the 
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discrepancy.  Rather, it is symptomatic of more fundamental differences in the existing 
political conditions that shaped the two cases.   
My study indicates that transitional justice mechanisms rely upon some facets of 
state power more than others.  Following periods of mass violence, obstacles to truth 
commission implementation become most acute under specific conditions.  In chapter 2 I 
argued that state failure should be understood as a single terminus of a broad spectrum of 
state strength.  I then reviewed the range of political conditions characteristic of weak 
states and outlined those most commonly cited in the literature as challenges to stability 
and political consolidation.  Assuming that a greater accumulation of these conditions 
translates into a weaker state, the presence of political fragmentation and state de-
legitimization in Liberia suggests that they were crucial in promoting the initial success 
of the Liberian TRC.   Contrary to much of the literature on weak states, which portrays 
these conditions as anathema to democratic consolidation, my findings suggest that the 
degree of state weakness in a particular case relates directly to the success of one form of 
transitional justice over another.  Counter intuitively, Sierra Leone was stronger in two 
ways that derailed its commission.   
Despite the apparent similarities of Liberia and Sierra Leone, de-legitimization 
and fragmentation dramatically altered the political landscape in which their respective 
truth commissions operations (see Figure 5.1).   While nearly being torn apart by an 
appallingly violent and prolonged period of conflict, the Sierra Leonean state managed to 
weather the chaos with a great deal of its legitimacy intact.  Additionally, with the 
exception of the largely discredited RUF, it had no challengers to its rule.  In the years 
following the end of hostilities, President Kabbah, while acceding to a truth commission 
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at the Lomé peace talks, had every incentive—and very few disincentives—to shirk his 
commitment to the TRC and work to eliminate his political rivals through prosecution.  
In the aftermath of its own conflict Liberia differed in both of these respects.  
Contrasted with the Freetown government, the NTGL was simply not credible and 
therefore did not have the necessary political capital to attempt any form of retributive 
justice.  Moreover, the level of political fragmentation in Liberia following the war was 
such that no group was powerful enough to harness a prosecutorial mechanism.  This 
fragmentation also presented an opportunity for Liberia’s truth commission by preventing 
a general amnesty provision or concrete guidelines for a truth commission from making 
their way into the final language of the Accra Accords, leaving the door open for future 
prosecution. 
Figure 5.1: Weak state conditions and their significance in determining truth commission success 
 Present in Sierra 
Leone? 
Present in Liberia? Important for truth 
commission success? 
1. De-legitimization of the 
state 
No Yes Yes 
2. Corruption & deterioration 
of public services 
Yes Yes No 
3. Failure of democratic norms Yes Yes No 
4. Widespread human rights 
abuses 
Yes Yes No 
5. Political fragmentation No Yes Yes 
6. Presence of an international 
intervention force 
Yes Yes No 
 
This presents a paradox.  How do we explain the fact that truth commissions in 
states much stronger than Sierra Leone (Argentina, South Africa, etc.) have had greater 
success?  This is a question that warrants future research, but addressing it briefly here I 
would argue that, similar to weak states, strong states present additional political 
conditions that are favorable to restorative justice.  For instance, President Alfonsín in 
Argentina and Aylwin in Chile had to deal with a number of competing interests, 
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including the persistent opposition of the military, which prevented prosecutions, but 
opened a space for a strong truth commission.  Conversely, Sierra Leone, a state that like 
Argentina and Chile exhibits high levels of legitimacy and consolidation was able to 
move forward with prosecutions that ultimately undermined its TRC. 
State legitimacy and consolidation, it seems, only support truth commissions in 
the presence of additional conditions of state strength.  Unlike Argentina or Chile, the 
Sierra Leonean conflict scoured the country of rival institutions, granting President 
Kabbah unchecked power to pursue his retributive agenda and make the Special Court 
essentially the only game in town.  Put differently, Sierra Leone occupies a unique space 
on the spectrum of state strength where it is strong in two important ways that allowed it 
to pursue a prosecutorial agenda, but lacking in a number of additional conditions that 
would have better supported a truth commission (see Figure 5.2).   
Figure 5.2: Spectrum of State Strength 
 
 
 
 
 
Strong                                                                                                                                       
Weak 
 
 
 
 
Still a more fundamental issue looms.  This study has demonstrated that state 
legitimacy and political fragmentation matter in the creation of a truth commission, but it 
has only begun to elaborate how they matter.  These conditions reflect deeper questions 
about how power is organized in the aftermath of violent conflict.  As demonstrated 
above, the concentration of power in the hands of a small group of state actors creates a 
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political climate quite favorable to retributive justice, but anathema to truth commissions.  
When power is concentrated in a number of competing institutions, as in Argentina, Chile 
or other strong states, prosecutions become untenable while the favorability for truth 
commissions increases.  The Liberian case demonstrates a similar phenomenon in which 
power is so fragmented or diffuse that no single state actor is capable of launching 
prosecutions or disrupting a commission.  Interestingly, this implies that, in terms of 
achievement, it makes little difference whether a truth commission operates in a strong 
state or a state that is extremely weak.  Rather, it is the more ambiguous space where 
conditions of weakness interlace with conditions of strength that is most likely to 
jeopardize their success.  
How these varying currents of power manifest themselves in areas outside of 
transitional justice is a question that demands closer scrutiny.  For example, I have spent 
little time addressing the unique role civil society played in these contexts.  Women’s 
groups, for instance, while never previously a force to be reckoned with in Liberia, 
appeared at Accra en masse and have been the principal advocates of the Liberian TRC 
since its inception.  Looking beyond the immediate political implications of  de-
legitimization and fragmentation, is it possible that civil conflict and state failure act as 
some form of violent purging process, stripping away old institutions and social 
inhibitors and carving a new, unobstructed political landscape where previously silenced 
social groups and actors are freed to endorse radical new agendas?  Does a greater level 
of state failure paradoxically promote not only truth commissions, but an entirely novel 
and progressive social order?  While I cannot offer an adequate answer here, recent 
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research by Aili Tripp, for example, suggests that this type of fragmentation may open 
spaces for women to participate in politics in new ways.  
What, then, are the implications of this study?  Ideally, its applications will extend 
well beyond Liberia and Sierra Leone.  How to best address the wrongs of the past has 
become a question with profound consequences for post-conflict societies.  State 
weakness clearly should not be a goal and I do not mean to put forward such a notion 
here.  However, if we are able to more concretely identify the political conditions that are 
most favorable to the establishment of a truth commissions, the information can aid 
societies newly-emerged from conflict in selecting the appropriate approach to redressing 
past wrongs.  As the international community and, more specifically, the transitional 
justice community turns its gaze to new cases such as Somalia, the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Afghanistan, and Iraq we may now have a better idea of what type of 
transitional justice mechanism certain contexts demand.  Particularly in cases of states 
recently emerged from conflict and near collapse, where resources are scant, 
infrastructure is shattered, and trust is hard to come by, this could save a state both 
financial and political capital while avoiding future bloodshed. 
That being said, I remain deeply cognizant of limitations of this thesis.  As I have 
striven to emphasize throughout this study, states are unique to a point where 
categorization begets only over-generalization and confusion.  Somalia, for example, has 
exhibited a particularly high level of political fragmentation, but unlike Liberia or Sierra 
Leone, it has also developed highly sophisticated local level institutions that may be more 
adept at dealing with issues of justice and reconciliation.  In the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, moreover, geographical limitations (the country is roughly the size of continental 
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Europe) may render a national reconciliation project excessively unwieldy.  Thus, 
whether these results would hold true in other contexts has yet to be determined. 
A more specific concern is this paper’s limited definition of success.  As I warned 
in Chapter 3, my understanding of success is necessarily based on each commission’s 
mandate as well as their short-term achievements.  Although weak state conditions 
appear to have supported Liberia’s commission in these respects, when we consider 
broader points of success such as a sustained peace, democratic consolidation, and 
national reconciliation they still loom large; the good produced by these conditions may 
still be overwhelmed by the bad.  Indeed, it is quite possible that Liberia’s infrastructural 
and political limitations will ultimately bar it from following through on its commitment 
to the implement the commission’s recommendations.  Equally worrying is the possibility 
that, should the Liberian government decide to move forward with large-scale reforms 
and prosecutions (as President Johnson-Sirleaf recently promised), it will upset the 
delicate peace and democratic gains accumulated over the past six years.  
This study represents the first step in a much broader process of honing our 
collective understanding of conflict resolution, national reconciliation, and democratic 
consolidation.  What holds constant is that, irrespective of the form it takes, justice is a 
political and social imperative.  Making wise choices about implementation can make the 
difference between sustained progress toward lasting peace and a return to violence; it 
can begin to close old wounds or tear them anew.   
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